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ABSTRACT
Social networks in any form, specifically online social networks (OSNs), are becoming a part
of our everyday life in this new millennium especially with the advanced and simple communication technologies through easily accessible devices such as smartphones and tablets.
The data generated through the use of these technologies need to be analyzed for forensic purposes when criminal and terrorist activities are involved. In order to deal with the
forensic implications of social networks, current research on both digital forensics and social
networks need to be incorporated and understood. This will help digital forensics investigators to predict, detect and even prevent any criminal activities in different forms. It will
also help researchers to develop new models/techniques in the future. This paper provides
literature review of the social network forensics methods, models, and techniques in order to
provide an overview to the researchers for their future works as well as the law enforcement
investigators for their investigations when crimes are committed in the cyber space. It also
provides awareness and defense methods for OSN users in order to protect them against to
social attacks.
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Social Networks Analysis, Online Social Networks, Crime,
Terror, Deception, Social Attacks
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Digital forensics, a branch of forensic science,
deals with the investigation and recovery of
digital information found in digital devices
which are mostly found at crime/incident
scenes. Early twenty-first century became
the golden age of digital forensics because
of the technological advances in today’s
world. Especially with convenient accessibility of smart devices, most data are now being stored and shared in digital forms such
as pictures, diaries, calendars, videos, etc.
Smart phones, tablets, computers, smart
household devices. Moreover, wearable devices have already become part of our everyday life. The demand towards the usage of technological advances makes tremendous amount of data being stored and shared
particularly in online social networks. This
inevitable developments make any device a
storage of potential evidence related to a
crime or an incident.
Any type of information stored or transferred in digital form can be identified as
digital evidence (Nelson et al., 2015). The
data collected from social networks may contain invaluable evidence for a digital forensics investigator in both criminal and corporate investigations. For example, social media is one of the recent developments that attracts everyone regardless of their age, gender, socioeconomic status, etc. and it produces large amount of digital data for analysis (Raghavan, 2013).
Social network analysis (SNA) is a method
of using network and graph theories in order to investigate and analyze social structures for different circumstances (Otte &
Rousseau, 2002). From the digital forensics
investigation point of view, the main goal
of using SNA in forensically sound manner
is to understand the relations (i.e., links or
edges) between the actors (nodes) for variety
of purposes such as solving criminal activiPage 56
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ties, preventing terrorist attacks, identifying
social attacks, detecting deceptions, categorizing and matching social network accounts,
etc. Mathematical models, techniques and
tools are developed in order to improve understanding, preventing, detecting, and predicting potential criminal activities. Therefore, it is an absolute need for investigators
and researchers to be familiar with such work
in order to confront with related challenges.
Figure 1 shows sample forensics studies using
OSNs on crime and terror incidents around
the world.
The vast usage of OSNs and availability of supporting application interfaces have
attracted significant forensics analysis on
OSNs. Furthermore, the number of offenses
against the law where OSNs are utilized is
also increasing everyday. It is necessary to
understand and analyze crimes and attacks
through online social networks and prevent
criminal activities, detect malicious users,
and solve criminal cases. Moreover, the
safety of OSN users should be increased as
much as possible. We have analyzed numerous papers related to threats mediated
through OSNs. The diversity and numerousness of research studies along with significant similarities in terms of the ways these
crime/terror networks operate, how social
attacks are designed, and damages caused by
these criminal activities and attacks aggravate feasibility of an effective forensic analysis as well as a comprehensive survey of studies. In the literature, we have not found a
comprehensive coverage of topics that would
help forensics analysts see the broad picture
of cases and understand existing attacks and
solve their cases. Our approach is not to
list possible threats and cover relevant studies for each threat. For example, identitytheft, identity cloning, spam, child pornography, finding crime networks have been studied and solutions have been proposed for
each type of crime or attack. Such coverc 2016 ADFSL

A Survey of Social Network Forensics

JDFSL V11N4

Figure 1. Map of sample crime analyses around the world
age has limitations for forensics analysts and
typically requires new ways of understanding
with the launch of a new type of attack.
The main goal of this paper is to provide an extensive review of social network
forensics research that would help to understand various aspects of forensics research
on OSNs starting from crime and terror network structures and their analysis to social
attacks through OSNs, and the countermeasure methods against to these attacks. Particularly, we present relevant research in a
way that necessary tools could be developed
for forensics community, systematic methods
could be designed for solving crimes (initiated through OSNs), and methods for protecting OSN users are applied effectively.
A survey on social network analysis is
not complete without covering topics related
to crime/terror networks and social attacks.
Therefore we cover both aspects in this survey. We explain how OSNs can be analyzed to understand crime and terror network structures, how social attacks are designed, how OSN users could be protected,
and how methods could be developed to help
c 2016 ADFSL

forensics analysts to detect, solve or prevent social attacks. The major difference between terror/crime network structures and
social attacks through online social networks
is that the first one is organized by a group of
people whereas the second group of attacks
could be initiated by a single person. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
comprehensive area survey of social network
forensics with respect to aforementioned objectives. Therefore, the major contribution
of our paper is the organization and coverage of diverse research studies on crimes and
attacks, which could have similar damages
or utilize similar methods, to help forensics
community and protect OSN users. More
specifically, our paper has the following contributions:
• a comprehensive overview of research
studies on crime and terror network
structures with focus on analyzing network structures, spatial analysis of
crime networks, ranking individuals and
relationships, identifying co-offending
networks, similarity of crime networks,
Page 57
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information diffusion related to terrorist attacks, and socio-economic relationships affecting crime and terror,
• a novel categorization and analysis of
social attacks through online social networks based on proposed four levels of
attacks: (i) crime or criminal activity
(e.g., identity-theft, child pornography),
(ii) type of attack (i.e., information disclosure or opinion/emotion influence)
(iii) scheme of attack (social engineering and information discovery), and (iv)
attack components (fake identity, fake
messaging, fake relationship, and data
crawling) and coverage of literature including children-oriented attacks with
respect to this categorization,
• coverage of forensics analysis methods and protection according to our
categorization of attacks including our
proposed way of categorizing privacy
preservation methods, handling fake
identities (user categorization, profile matching, authorship analysis, detecting deception, defenses for deanonymization), handling fake messages
(preventing, detecting, demoting, credibility, improving resilience to infection),
handling fake relationships, and searching traces of data, and
• a detailed list of open research issues
and future direction along with suggestions for OSN users, OSN service
providers, forensics analysts and law enforcement agencies.
This paper is organized as follows. The
following section provides research studies
related to understanding analysis of crime
and terror network structures with respect
to ranking individuals and relationships, cooffending relationships, spatial analysis of
Page 58
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networks, similarity of crime networks, visualization of such networks, information diffusion not only for terror attacks but also for
white-collar crimes, and influence of socioeconomic relationship on crime and terror.
Section 3 discusses social attacks through
online social networks. Forensic analysis and
defense methods for social attacks are particularly explained in Section 4. Finally, the
last section introduces open research issues
in social network forensics based on currently
available methods and concludes our paper.

2. UNDERSTANDING
CRIME AND TERROR
NETWORK
STRUCTURE
Understanding crime and terror network
structures plays critical role for forensics investigations. The analysis of these structures include understanding the rank of individuals, relationships and roles of people, collaboration among individuals and different networks, spatial analysis based on
mobility, and similarity between networks.
Determining the underlying graphs may be
used to crack down these networks and prevent possible attacks. Despite the vital importance of such analysis, currently available
digital forensics tools (both commercial and
open source) are not sophisticated enough
to provide thorough analysis. On the other
hand, there are many research efforts to answer this need individually by focusing on
particular events and incidents.
In Table 1, we categorize relevant research
on network structures along with other factors that influence crime and terror networks. Once the structures are identified,
tools and techniques to further analyze them
becomes necessary. Hence, in this section we
discuss available methods, tools and techniques which are used to analyze network
c 2016 ADFSL
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structures, perform ranking among the individuals in criminal networks, measure similarities between the criminal networks, and
investigate diffusion information on these
networks. Furthermore, we also aim to attract digital forensics researchers’ and tool
developers’ attention to these available studies for their future tool developments on network analysis in a broader sense. In the next
section we start with network structure analysis using certain metrics on individuals as
well as their relations and behaviors in the
crime and terror networks.

2.1

Network Structure
Analysis

In order to understand the network structure
analysis, it is crucial to grasp centrality metrics which are classified as the most known
characteristics of the network analysis. The
Degree centrality is the number of ties that
a node has whereas the betweenness centrality is the number of shortest paths from all
vertices to all others that pass through a specific node averaged over all pairs of node in a
network. The closeness centrality is the sum
of distances to all other nodes. These centralities may reveal information about links
between individuals and their roles in network structures.
Morselli et al. (2007) investigate Kreb’s
terrorist network (V. Krebs, 2002) and the
Caviar network (UCINET, 2017) in order to
analyze the effects of degree, betweenness,
and closeness centrality criteria, and how
they can be used for the detection of terrorist
networks and criminal enterprise networks.
The Kreb’s terrorist network data consists of
37 participants in which 19 of them are hijackers who executed the attacks and other
18 additional contributing criminals. On the
other hand, the Caviar network includes 110
participants of a profit driven criminal enterprise network. The major difference bec 2016 ADFSL
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tween these two datasets is that the Kreb’s
terrorist network is described as a snake-like,
sparse network showing substantial distance
within the members of the group whereas the
Caviar’s Network is a cluster-like network
with shorter distances between the members.
In their study, terrorist activities are observed to be operated without a core centrality member or person, whereas criminal
enterprise networks such as drug trafficking
built around the central members. Such
analysis can be used to understand the purpose of forming criminal groups.
Centrality metrics can be also quite useful
when performing analysis on the resilience
of a network. For instance, Piraveenan et
al. (2012) introduce a metric to analyze the
structural robustness of networks by measuring the change of size of the largest component with respect to the network node removals. This measure is suitable for random
and sequential node removals. In an ideal robust network, node removal should decrease
the size of the largest component linearly,
whereas in real networks this decrease could
be nonlinear. Therefore, the robustness coefficient can be defined as the ratio of the
size of the largest component in this network to the size of the largest component
in ideal robust network. After defining the
coefficient, Piraveenan et al. (2012) demonstrated how it can be used to evaluate the
real world network data. An analysis is done
for degree based ordering, betweenness centrality based ordering, and closeness centrality based ordering to show that this measure
can be valuable to choose a strategy to attack/defend a network. Degree based attack
analysis is performed by removing the highest order node in a network whereas random
attack analysis is performed by removing a
node in random degree order.
The experiment results for different networks reveal that cortical networks, neural
networks and food webs show the highest roPage 59
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Table 1. Overview of studies on network structures and information diffusion
Paper

Category

Application

Data Source

Location
/Attack

Twitter

Los Angeles

Bora et al. (2013)

network structure

street gangs

Ozgul & Erdem (2012)

identify networks

drug network

Diyarbakir

Ozgul & Erdem (2012)

co-offending

criminal &

Bursa,
Diyarbakir

Tayebi & Glasser (2012)

co-offending

Hipp et al. (2013)

information
diffusion

Morselli et al. (2007)

network structure

Tayebi et al. (2014)

co-offending&

drug networks

social tie &
crime relationship
leadership

Police Information

spatial behavior
Frank (2001)

co-offending

Hipp (2010)

socio-econonomics

Baker & Faulkner (2004)

social network

Metro
Vancouver

Retrieval System
offender-crime
reporting
relationship

Stockholm

social distance-

American

crime relationship

Housing Survey

fraud

Fountain Oil &

Ventura County

Gas company

California

communication
McBride & Caldara (2013)

Krebs, Caviar

criminal network
visualization

Semenov et al. (2013)

network structure

tracking activities

vk.com

Boston bomber

Burnap et al. (2014)

information
diffusion

survival & volume

Twitter

Woolwich,

Sundsoy et al. (2012)

communication

Telenor

&relations

(phone calls)

of messages

Wiil et al. (2010)

network structure

Breiger et al. (2014)

groups
connectivity,

Spezzano et al. (2013)

network structure

London, UK
Oslo

link importance

9/11 & 2002
Bali

& removal

night attack

drug trading

similarity

Big Allied and
Dangerous (BAAD-1)

person successor

Sageman’s Alqaeda

problem

and Lashkar-e-Taiba

Husslage et al. (2015)

network structure

ranking individuals

Al Qaeda 9/11

Schweinberger et al. (2014)

information
diffusion

relief

9/11 Attack

Ozgul et al. (2011)

network similarity

modus operandi

operations
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bustness whereas the Internet networks are
among the least robust networks. This implies that man-made rapidly evolving networks are more vulnerable than biological
networks. Lastly the results show that
(i) the networks are more robust to random attacks and vulnerable to targeted attacks, and (ii) the networks are least robust
against betweenness centrality based attack
and most robust against closeness centrality
based attacks. Network characteristics provide invaluable perspectives to better understand the complexity of the crime networks.
Two papers above may not directly reflect
the nature of researches on forensics investigation; however, they provide unique angles
to see already complex structures, namely
terrorist and criminal networks.
In addition to the network analysis from
the centrality metrics perspective, categorization of users by their behaviors, and the
analysis of these categorization in online social networks can be helpful to extract criminal networks from social networks. For instance, Vigliotti & Hankin (2015) focus on
detecting unidentified criminals by following
a few known criminals on social networks.
They implemented a model derived from binomial distribution and discrete time models
for behavior classification (normal or abnormal) by checking the instances of the behavior occurrences. The experiments are performed on two datasets: (i) Twitter dataset
containing 11K users followed in a period of
45 weeks and (ii) the VAST dataset containing 400 users’ phone records over 10 days. A
directed graph (N, E) is constructed where
N represents the number of nodes and E represents the edges between these nodes. A
time interval can be defined as [tn , t(n+1) ],
where tn is the beginning time of an event
and t(n+1) is the end of the event. With respect to time series, relationship of the edges
can be obtained easily by using the equations
below.
c 2016 ADFSL
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Ni. (t) =

X

Ni,j (t)

(1)

Ni,j (t)

(2)

j,i6=j

N.j (t) =

X
i,i6=j

N.. (t) =

XX

Nij (t)

(3)

j,i6=j i,i6=j

Equation 1 represents the outgoing edges
from node i, Equation 2 represents the incoming edges to node i, and the Equation 3
is the count of both outgoing and incoming
connections for node i. Considering time intervals for each event, the time series for each
node can be obtained as dN (t1 ), dN (t2 ), . . . ,
dN (tn ) where dN (tk ) represents the number
of relevant communications between time tk
and tk+1 . The probability of a communication at interval t1 is defined as P (dN (t1 )).
The number of communications over n intervals can be specified using a random variable
B(n) = dN (t1 ) + dN (t2 ) + . . . + dN (tn ) assuming that the presence of communication
is sampled using Bernoulli. The probability of r communications can simply be computed using the binomial distribution as in
Equation 4:
 
n r
P(B(n) = r) =
π (1 − π)n−r
r

(4)

The authors use discrete time stochastic process to model the connections (e.g., telephone calls) in a network. The links (at least
one communication over interval) between
nodes are sampled using Bernoulli (Be(π))
while the frequency (r) of links between two
nodes over an n intervals is modeled using
Binomial distribution.
As a result of these experiments, it is
shown that 36 suspects out of 400 users in
VAST dataset are detected. As for the Twitter dataset, roughly 1,600 out of ∼11K Twitter users were detected as suspects. In both
Page 61
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cases, the number of anomalous nodes stays
below ∼10% of the total population. This
work clearly shows, despite the privacy related concerns, that publicly available data
on online social networks may be monitored
in order to detect perpetrators and criminals by knowing the characteristics of known
criminals on online social networks.
Links in a network deliver important insights on analysis of a crime and how it is
committed. In addition to (Vigliotti & Hankin, 2015), Semenov et al. (2013) describe
how social media could be helpful for law
enforcement in order to track the traces before and after a crime is committed. The
authors claim that potential traces can be
found in social media sites in order to prevent crimes if the profiles are analyzed before
the crime is committed. They specifically
take the Boston Bomber case as their focus and present how activities can be traced.
Data is collected from vk.com (Russia based
social network) using an API provided by
vk.com. Boston Bomber case is first analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively. The
collected data from one of the suspects’ profile show the dynamics on the terrorists’ alleged social media accounts before and after the attack. They also present data regarding the origin of the activities on those
alleged accounts with respect to the comments on suspect’s profile and the number
of contributing users by the country. Second, the case is analyzed from the social network analysis point of view. The collected
data consists of 1,208,892 nodes in total including the terrorist friends, second degree
friends, and third degree friends. In their
analysis, they show the number of friends
found in the first, second and third degree
friend circles and the origins of these friends
regarding to their countries. They also show
how the suspect’s friends stop following him
after his name appeared on news. In the
meantime, data also show that some the alPage 62
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leged suspect’s friends appear in the network
to support him by sharing pictures and posts
of him claiming his innocence.
Most of the time, a single representation
of a network structure may not be enough
to grasp the complete story of the network
where there can be hidden insights. Analysts and the investigators need an integrated suite of capabilities that can help
them rapidly understand and glean insight
from a network, visualize knowledge by interacting with data, and collaborate to draw
conclusions. Hence, we now discuss a brief
summary of visualization for crime and terrorist networks particularly on virtual networks.
Visualization of networks is studied in order to understand the cognitive recognition
process of human subjects on various network representations. We are aware that
there are other works which merely focus
on visual representations of networks themselves without taking human perception into
account (e.g., Chen et al. (2004); J. Xu
& Chen (2005); C. C. Yang & Ng (2007);
Didimo et al. (2011); Chen et al. (2003)).
However, they are out of the scope of this
work.
The presentation of data in a pictorial
or graphical format makes a big difference.
Visual representations such as charts and
maps help understand information more easily and quickly. In a research conducted by
(McBride & Caldara, 2013), a comparative
study of the data representation in either a
table based or graph based representation is
presented and discussed in order to get more
meaningful visual representation of a criminal network. A mathematical model is designed in order to demonstrate the criminal
networks. Then, an experiment of three sessions is set up with 86 subjects. Subjects are
shown some networks which are randomly
selected by a computer from a set of 10 out
of 16 networks. The networks are randomly
c 2016 ADFSL
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generated to illustrate the typical degree distribution of the social networks. As an outcome of the experiments, it is stated that a
graph representation leads to a faster disruption decision on the criminal networks; however, the table style representation may lead
to a more accurate disruption choice. Even
though there is a trade-off between these two
approaches, using both can give the best results.
As the above works show, the analyses of
network structures for both terror and criminal groups (including individuals involved)
would provide law enforcement and forensics
examiners quite a bit of knowledge and evidence about the incidents in order to answer
their questions.

2.2

Spatial Analysis of Crime
Networks

In addition to structural network analysis,
spatial analysis is also critical for identification of criminal groups and their activities.
Spatial analysis from this aspect aims at
identifying and quantifying spatial relationships and distributions of crime patterns. In
this section, we provide summaries of spatial analysis research focusing on crime networks such as identification of the radicalization (Mazumder et al., 2013), human behavior and mobility patterns (Bora et al., 2013)
and prediction of the locations of upcoming
criminal activities (Tayebi et al., 2014).
Online social networks can be used to
identify radicalization using the content
and geolocation of tweets of the users.
Mazumder et al. (2013) state that online social networks provide large amount of information on what people feel about other people, places, events, and political activities,
etc.. As a part of the Minerva project at
Arizona State University, activity information of the twitter users has been collected to
understand political activities of Indonesia.
c 2016 ADFSL
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Based on these data, a heat map is generated for the radical activities in provinces of
Indonesia by computing radicalization index
and location index of each Twitter user from
Indonesia. Rather than considering tweets
individually, all data of a user are analyzed.
A degree of radicalism is assigned to each
user based on the content of his or her tweets.
Since Twitter API provides geolocation of
tweets, it is possible to track the location of
a user based on his or her tweets. Hence, geolocation is used as another parameter. Considering tweets for the same user might have
been posted in different provinces, a probability distribution estimate is used per user.
Results show high accuracy in detecting radicalism in users’ tweets. The higher the value
in the radicalism index, the higher the radicalism is in the province.
Mobile devices, on the other hand, generate enormous amount of data from location
services. These data help model human behavior and mobility patterns. The study in
(Bora et al., 2013) aims to observe human
movement to understand the relationships
of geographical regions, neighborhoods, and
gang territories by analyzing 10 million geographically tagged tweets from Los Angeles.
Using a graph based representation of street
gang territories as vertices, and interactions
between them as edges, they train a machine
learning classifier (i.e., Naive Bayes Classifier) in order to distinguish the rival and
non-rival links. They were able to correctly
identify 89% of the true rivalry network,
which beats a standard baseline by about
30%. Looking at larger neighborhoods, they
were able to show that the distance traveled
from home follows a power-law distribution,
and the direction of displacement (i.e., the
distribution of movement direction) can be
used as a profile to identify physical (or geographic) barriers when it is not uniform.
Finally, considering the temporal dimension
of tweets, they have detected events taking
Page 63
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place around the city by identifying irregularities in tweeting patterns. This method
can be easily adapted to create new tools for
law enforcement to detect outbreaks led by
gangs and other criminal actors in real time.
In addition to real time event detection, it
is also possible to predict future criminal activities. In order to do that, spatial behavior
of criminals can be analyzed to predict the
whereabouts of their upcoming criminal activities. Tayebi et al. (2014) propose a probabilistic model on the well-known offenders’ spatial behavior and an extended version of earlier random walk model derived by
Short et al. (2008), CRIMETRACER, which
brings functionality to generate the activity
space associated with the offenders living in
an urban area. In CRIMETRACER, random walk process is personalized by using
co-offending information, crime trends of offenders, and also the crime event history of
road segments in order to uncover the unknown spatial behavior of every single offender. The data is retrieved from the Police
Information Retrieval System (PIRS) which
particularly focuses on crimes in Metro Vancouver, where there is a road network composed of 64,108 road segments with an average length 0.2 km. In CRIMETRACER, the
first task is to get the list of an offender’s
crime events chronologically. Then, it generates the offender’s activity space by training
the model with the first 80% of the crime
data. The rest of the data (the crime locations in particular) are used for testing the
model. In the evaluation, offenders with at
least two different crime locations are considered, which corresponds to ∼10% of the offenders in the crime data set. The results of
CRIMETRACER are evaluated with methods such as random walk, hot spots, proximity, offender-based collaborative filtering
(CF), location-based CF, co-offending-based
CF which are similar to the state-of-theart methods for location recommendation.
Page 64
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CRIMETRACER exceeds all other methods
which are used in the experiments.

2.3

Ranking Individuals and
Relationships in Crime
Networks

As discussed above, nodes represent the active objects in the terror and crime networks.
In many cases, nodes establish, maintain,
and control the events occurring in the network. In this section, we explain research
studies which particularly focus on analyzing the ranking of individuals and criminals
(Sarvari et al., 2014; Husslage et al., 2015),
importance of links between the nodes (Wiil
et al., 2010), and the person successor problem (Spezzano et al., 2013).
Sarvari et al. (2014) suggest that information regarding the organization of a criminal community can be achieved by analyzing
criminal social graph structures. Sarvari et
al. (2014) aim to construct a large scale social graph from a small set of email addresses
of some criminals. By using the Facebook
profiles that were associated with these email
addresses, they constructed a social graph
of 43,000 nodes using 1,000 email addresses.
Then, a large scale analysis was performed
on this graph to identify profiles of high rank
criminals, criminal organizations, and large
scale communities of criminals. Finally, a
manual analysis was performed on these profiles to detect many public criminal groups
on Facebook. The data (email addresses)
were collected from BestRecovery (V. Krebs,
2002), an online data theft service. Centrality measures and community detection
techniques were used to determine criminals
having a central position in the graph, subgroups and communities found in the network, criminals acting as brokers of collaboration and information in the network, and
the ranking of criminals based on their importance and influence on the network. It
c 2016 ADFSL
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was shown that the key members of the networks had high ranks with respect to every centrality measure. The similar results
were observed with the PageRank dataset
(Page et al., 1999) as well. This shows that
highly connected members are positioned in
the center of the graph. This also indicates
that they have connections with other wellconnected members. If we take the readily
available social network websites and corresponding data collection tools into account,
it would be indispensable technique for law
enforcement to identify and eventually eliminate key figures in such criminal communities.
In addition to the identification of key
players in terrorist networks, the terrorist
networks can also be used for ranking individuals and ultimately preventing likely terrorist attacks. Husslage et al. (2015) introduce a new game theoretic model as an
extension of (Lindelauf et al., 2011). In
addition to the earlier work, this method
also takes the operational strength of connected networks into account. The ultimate
aim of the proposed model is two-fold: providing certain strategies to prevent possible
terrorist attacks, and destabilizing the terrorist networks by ranking the individuals
based on their importance in the terrorist
networks. Authors used sensitivity analysis on the rankings gathered from the Al
Qaeda’s 9/11 dataset (Kean et al., 2004)
(B. Krebs, 2013) for the purpose of testing the robustness of their model. During
the analysis, they took possible additional
information of the network members, variations in relational strengths, and the absence or presence of a small percentage links
in the network into account. Their proposed
game theoretic model was developed by using monotonic weighted connectivity game.
This model is used to calculate the centrality
measure of the network. In the rest of this
work, the authors used sensitivity analysis
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methods to test their models’ robustness under different circumstances including small
variations in the weights, addition/deletion
of a small portion of the links, and changes
in the weights related to interactions. The
results show that their model is robust in a
sense that it is able to rank the individuals
in the network despite small changes in the
dataset. Considering the successful applications of game theoretic models into many
real life problems particularly in security related issues (Zhang et al., 2013; Jiang et al.,
2014; Delle Fave et al., 2014), we expect to
see more of similar methods being applied to
various digital forensics domains in addition
to (Husslage et al., 2015).
Thus far, we have discussed the importance of the nodes in various network analysis methods. However, the links of a network
may play a critical role as its nodes with respect to network efficiency and secrecy. Wiil
et al. (2010) aim to determine which link
rather than node is playing more crucial role
in communication, and also whether or not
removing the respective link affects the secrecy and efficiency of the network. After analyzing the current available strategies, the
authors implemented a method to analyze
the importance of links in a terrorist network
based on a transportation network (which
is later implemented in CrimeFighter Assistant (Wiil et al., 2010)) and other wellknown terrorist attacks. The idea of this
method/technique is originated from the social networking analysis concept. In this proposed concept, removal of an important link
from the network is expected to result destabilization of the network, since removing the
link would result in connection or communication loss between the connecting nodes.
This work was claimed to be the first implementation of the secrecy and efficiency measures when analyzing the link importance.
After the complete analysis on the transportation network, a balanced view is prePage 65
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sented for analyzing the data of a terrorist
network by giving importance to links. Later
this algorithm was tested on the well-known
attacks such as 9/11 network and 2002 Bali
night club bombing network. This algorithm
was implemented in the CrimeFighter Assistant and compared with other approaches.
The authors show that the measure of link
importance proposes ways to view the important links that affect the performance of
the terrorist networks for their destabilization.
Now we discuss the link formation in a
social network after a critical node is removed in addition to above study on link
removal. We believe this method may also
help law enforcement to determine successor of a terrorist leader in terrorist networks
when particular nodes are removed. Spezzano et al. (2013) present theoretical models
in order to study the Person Successor Problem (PSP) by analyzing person replacements
in terrorist groups. They aim to reduce the
lethality of the terrorist groups by predicting the possible replacements when an important figure (e.g., leader of the terrorist
group) is removed. They also aim to predict the new structure of the network after removal is performed. This work takes
the property and expertise of the individuals in terrorist networks into account when
predicting the changes in the network. The
authors developed two algorithms, STONEPredict and STONE-Reshape. These algorithms use a probability density function
based on a probabilistic model in order to
predict the person replacement and the reshaping of the network. These algorithms
are tested on three datasets. The first
dataset is synthetic dataset created by the
authors. The second and third datasets
are Sageman’s Al-Qaeda network Sageman
(2004) and Lashkar-e-Taiba network Subrahmanian et al. (2012) respectively. The results show that STONE-Predict algorithm
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achieves 80% accuracy of predicting who will
replace the removed person in the network
when tested on those datasets. In testing,
the information in real datasets were used
as ground truth, and domain experts were
consulted. This work shows that collection
of good data regarding terrorist of crime
networks (e.g., Project Caviar (UCINET,
2017)) and using proposed algorithms after
analyzing the dataset may eventually help to
diminish these networks by identifying the
key figures and their successors.

2.4

Identifying Co-offending
in Crime Networks

Collaborative crimes end up with bigger
impact and hazardous results. That is
why well-structured terrorist groups become
threats known globally. Having a network
with high density complicates the understanding of the organization and the control
dynamics of a network. Identification of the
co-offending characteristics of a crime network provides insights for defense and security purposes. In this section, we provide overview on identification of the features which lead to committing crimes by
Ozgul & Erdem (2013), partnership modeling and analysis of criminal networks by
Tayebi & Glasser (2012); Frank (2001).
Identifying features that lead to committing crimes in a collaboration is important for forensics research. Ozgul & Erdem
(2013) studied the identification of the crime
features which are important for committing
crime together. In their methodology, they
first collected the co-offending connections of
the criminals which represent the previous
cooperation. Second, the spatio-temporal
and modus operandi are used to identify the
criminal networks. Third, they combined
latter two outcomes to conclude whether
it can help for detection of current criminal networks. Finally, demographic simic 2016 ADFSL
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larities of the criminals are used to observe
the current networks. Two criminal network
datasets from Turkey were used in their experiments: Bursa and Diyarbakir. Bursa
dataset consists of 6,114 crimes, 478 criminals in 85 experimental criminal networks;
on the other hand, Diyarbakir dataset contains 40 drug networks with about 56 crimes
and 154 criminal records. The authors conclude that the history of the criminal connectivity plays a very important role in the current criminal networks. On the other hand
the type of crime may differ but does not
depend on the demographic characteristics.
Moreover, analyzing partnerships between
criminals or criminal networks can help to
understand co-offending networks. Tayebi &
Glasser (2012) proposed a co-offending network analysis which can be handled benefiting from the social network analysis with the
use of machine learning techniques. Their
methodology is divided into four sections:
modeling the crime data and extraction of
the co-offending network, a group detection technique that is an extension of the
clique percolation method, crime determination process that produces the same characteristics of the crimes, and an evaluation
model that can analyze the groups in a
time period. In the data modeling, a crime
data is modeled as a tripartite hyper graph
H(N, E) where each node in N is categorized as actors (A) such as criminals, victims, suspects, etc., incidents (I) that are
the reported crimes, and resources (R) that
are used in a crime such as vehicle, weapon,
etc. A co-offending network is derived from
the nodes connected to each other for the
crimes they are involved together. Discovery
of a crime group is derived by an algorithm
that first collects the offender groups from
the data, computes the activity and criminality scores based on the crimes committed
by members, determines the resources benefited by the members, identifies the groups
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that are likely to be crime organizations, and
updates the group evaluation results for each
time frame. Dataset used in this project consists of roughly 4.4 million reported offenses,
∼4 million unique individuals, and 39 different subject groups. Five datasets in different sizes (with 9K to 21K data entries)
are chronologically divided and used. However, only offenses with more than one offender are considered. As a result, from ∼4.4
million crime records with 150K co-offending
networks, 20K of the offender groups are detected in which 1,800 of them were active. It
is stated that a continuous crime partnership
is observed and most of them do not endure
for long periods.

In addition to partnership of offenders,
relationship between offenders and victims
can also be modeled in order to analyze
and understand the network infrastructure.
Frank (2001) discusses a statistical network
model that can help to predict the secondary
participation of crimes and understand the
structure of co-offending youth networks.
The juvenile crime data in Stockholm is used
such that a bipartite graph model of the data
is built from assumptions about crime reporting and offender detection for a specific
type of crimes. A mathematical modeling of
a basic crime model, related crimes and cooffending crime models are given as a matrix
representation. In the given representations,
a connectivity is defined as an adjacency matrix to come up with a simple probabilistic
model for crime reporting and offender identification. Statistical inference (in particular, the number of co-offenders and the total
number of offenses) is discussed. The author shows that it can be possible to present
the numbers of offenders of different activities and estimate the total number of offenses
by the model parameters via the numbers of
crimes of different sizes.
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2.5

Measuring Similarity of
Crime Networks

Criminals and terrorists may form alliances,
operate as an underground network, and
share operational motivations. By analyzing
the similarities of crime networks, it may be
possible to determine the purpose of a newly
detected crime networks. In this section, we
deliver summaries on detection of the criminals based on their demographic features
(Ozgul & Erdem, 2012), two-mode network
analysis for understanding the formation and
involvement of the terrorist groups in drug
trading (Breiger et al., 2014), a similarity
metric extraction based on development of
the crime and the behaviors of the criminals
(Ozgul et al., 2011).
Demographic features such as kinship can
be effective for detection of the secondary
(other) criminals in the network. Ozgul &
Erdem (2012) propose an Extended Social
Detection Model (XSDM), which aims to
detect criminals by their demographic features such as ethnic origins, kinship, etc.
Their model is a successor model of the
Social Detection Model (SODM) (Ozgul et
al., 2010). A set of new features such as
neighborhood information which represents
the criminals who live in the same location are included to the new model. Their
method is composed of the following steps:
(i) link creation, (ii) populating link weights,
(iii) graph representation generation, (iv) detecting criminal networks, and (v) evaluating the detection results by using precision,
recall, and f-measure calculations. They
have performed their experiments on Diyarbakir Drug Network data collected from
Diyarbakir, a province in the southeastern
Turkey. The dataset consists of 2,552 individuals, and 221 previously known drug
dealing networks (DDN). The experiments
were conducted on different packages such as
R, RODBC, RBGL, igraph, SNA, etc. Out
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of 221 DDNs, 81 criminal networks were detected. As a result, by using the proposed
XSDM model, 0.88 precision, 0.39 recall, and
0.51 f-value results are obtained which are
better than the predecessor model, SODM.
High precision and respectively low recall indicates that their method is reliable when a
criminal network is detected, but it may miss
a lot of other criminal networks.
The social networks may also be analyzed
on whether if they serve to a specific purpose
such as drug trading. Breiger et al. (2014)
aim to analyze how terrorist groups are involved in drug trading by generalizing twomode network analysis method. They used a
limited set of 12 distinct properties (6 binary
variables and their complements) shown in
Table 2 to analyze terrorists’ drug trading involvements. They used the data from one of
the most extensive public datasets called as
Big Allied and Dangerous (BAAD-1) (Asal
et al., 2009). This dataset contains terrorist activities and attributes of 395 terrorist groups that were known to be active in
65 countries between 1998 and 2005. The
analysis model presented in this paper is
an extension (dual-mode) to Ragins Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) techniques (Ragin & Rihoux, 2009). The authors compared their findings with another
method called Barycentric correspondence
analysis (Greenacre, 1984). The analysis results for different test cases show different accuracies depending on the number of parameters used in the configuration. The highest
accuracy rate that an analyst is predicting
the drug trading achieved in one configuration is 78% while random guess only provides 9% accuracy since the database shows
only 35 out of 395 groups are known to be
involved in drug smuggling. With the best
configuration which covers the groups’ connectivity and similarity based on the given
parameters, the highest hit rate of 78% could
be achieved. As for the confidence intervals
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Table 2. Limited set of 12 distinct properties
Variable/Complement
DRUG (D)/drug (d)
CBRN (C)/cbrn (c)
DEGR (D)/degr (d)
TERS (T)/ters (t)
ETHN (E)/ethn (e)
SIZE (S)/size (s)

Description
Drug trade involvement (yes/no)
Chemical, biological, radio-logical, or nuclear weapon usage (yes/no)
Network degree level (high/low)
Control level of territory (strong/weak)
Founding ideology that emphasized ethnicity (yes/no)
Size of the network (large/small)

for consistency and coverage measures, this
work achieves 95% confidence interval when
the highest accuracy is achieved.
The terrorist networks can be compared
based on the way they commit or organize crimes. Ozgul et al. (2011) aim to develop a similarity metric for terrorist networks in Istanbul, Turkey. This work is
based on the ways that crimes are committed and behaviors of terrorist groups with
respect to their modus operandi. The authors developed crime ontology based similarity measure (COSM) model. In this
model, they used Direct Acyclic Graph for
developing crime ontology. After creating
the ontology, links are weighted in the network. After all the links are calculated, terrorist network similarity scores are determined based on the model. In order to test
their model, authors used Istanbul terrorist networks dataset. This dataset contains
attacks committed by 40 terrorist groups
in 2005, 2006, and 2007. In their experiments, authors show the similarity scores
which are calculated using COSM. The authors evaluated their model using COSM as
well as other similarity measure such as Cosine similarity and Jaccard similarity. They
report that COSM creates better clustering
based on the similarity scores than the other
two methods. They also validated their results with domain experts (i.e., law enforcement). However, experts criticized COSM
just solely being dependent on a crime and
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modus operandi similarity. It was recommended to expand COSM’s capabilities by
adding more attributes such as location and
date/time preference of terrorists.

2.6

Information Diffusion

The online social networks can be used as
online community watch to stop or solve
crimes due to fast data propagation in the
network. The connectivity and fast information sharing in social networks may be
helpful for stopping or solving crimes. According to (Zafarani et al., 2014), there exist four general types of information diffusion. These are herd behavior, information
cascades, diffusion of innovation, and epidemics. Herd behavior is related to when
individuals act upon actions of all others.
In information cascades, people only observe
their neighbors. Diffusion of innovations is
helpful in terms of observing how innovations spread across a population. Finally,
epidemic models are similar to diffusion of
innovations where infection is used instead
of adoption.
In sympathetic situations, information
tend to spread more attentively. Emotions
in such cases help people more in getting involved with the problem. Information diffusion on Facebook with respect to carjacking was investigated by (Dingli, 2012). In
case that owner learns that his or her car is
stolen, the owner does everything which can
help to recover the vehicle. Besides reportPage 69
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ing the incident immediately to the police,
the owner informs his or her own network
of friends about the misfortune. Facebook’s
Graph API (Facebook, 2005) was used in order to investigate a stolen car case and how
people create the appeal in Facebook and
what information is shared. As every object in Graph API is represented by a unique
ID, Mr. L’s profile unique ID is used in order to collect data from his wall’s properties
via the Graph API. A part of his car’s plate
number is used to search for posts relating
to the stolen car case. The results show that
the post which propagated most was shared
30 times, and more than 3 comments were
made on the photo. On other hand, more
than 37% of the users passively followed status messages of their friends and reacted on
them by writing comments. Due to the wellconnected structure of the nodes in social
networks as well as very locally clustered
connectivity, it can be said that the vast majority of connections span a short distance by
looking at how data propagates. Also, some
other findings are (i) posting in specific time
periods has a huge impact on the durability of data propagation (how long a message
gets attention) and (ii) user-generated posts
generate much more interactions in terms of
‘shares’ than the automated posts.
Another natural scenario where people
tend to reach information about their loved
ones is in the case of terrorist attacks. After the announcement of such tragic events
of which people feel emotional and urge to
make sure the ones they love have made it
through such events. From this extend, information diffusion for the after effects of a
terrorist attack in Woolwich, London, UK
was investigated by (Burnap et al., 2014).
After a terrorist attack, the size (or volume)
of information flow on a topic as well as
how long (survival) this topic keeps interest
among people are analyzed by studying social, temporal, and content measures. The
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data was derived from the Twitter based on
the retweeting action related to the Woolwich terrorist attack. In this work, different predictive methods are used and compared. For example, Zero Truncated Negative Binomial (ZTNB) regression method
(King, 1989) is used because of the plotted distribution gathered using dependent
size measure where the Cox regression technique (StatsDirect, 2017) is used in order to
model survival. The principal component
analysis is also used to reduce the dimensionality of the predictors like social, temporal, and content factors of the tweet. Based
on the information diffusion, five hypotheses
were proposed to predict the size and survival of information flow. The hypotheses
are based on sentiment and tension, online
and offline media association, linking content
features such as URLs and hashtags, etc.
Data collected from Twitter streaming API
about Woolwich tweets are subjected to preprocessing and re-coding prior to modeling.
In the pre-processing and re-coding stage, a
number of tweets are extracted and analysis
is performed based on the retweeting action
while filtering cases having retweeting size
less than five times. This extracted data is
modeled using the predictors of size and survival based on the aforementioned five hypotheses.
The analysis revealed significant changes
between the independent and dependent
variables of size and survival of information
flow adjoining a terrorist attack. It has been
shown that the main factors for predicting
the size and survival of information flow in
the event were temporal, social, and content factors. While offline media was a better predictor for the size of information flow,
the tension in tweets was determined to be
better indicator of survival of information
flow. Interestingly, it was concluded that
social factors provided the largest amount
of variance for the size, and content factors
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showed the predictive flow of information for
the survival. Individual perception varies depending on the interest and burst of enthusiasm which leads to rapid increase or decrease in information propagation as sometimes interest may fade at early stages of
tweets which eventually may reduce its lifetime. The lifespan of tweets can be increased
by using URLs or hashtags with combination of positive expression and low tension
for events like terrorist attacks.
Since social network platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter are not the only ones
to perform communication, other communication media can also be studied for information diffusion. One of the alternatives is
mobile phone operators. Communication between users of such operators can also be analyzed for studying information diffusion.
(Sundsoy et al., 2012) study how the usage of mobile devices increases at the time of
an occurrence of an unexpected event such
as 22 July Oslo Bombing. The main focus
of this paper is to show people’s behavior
in terms of their communication preferences
when they need to reach out their core social
networks when it is urgent. The phone data
retrieved from only single phone operator in
Norway called Telenor is analyzed. Each
person in the network represents a node and
the number of calls between the nodes represents the degree of closeness of one node
to another. The stronger the relation is the
more number of calls are expected. This
data is analyzed to observe how the number of calls increased during the bombing.
It also shows that, as expected, people tend
to call their closest relations first, and then
call other relations. The data is also analyzed for geographical spreading in the area
when the bombing occurred. The results
show that the call activation closer to the
explosion area increases 4 times when compared to an hour before the bombing. The
data does not contain the actual location of
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the user at the time of the incident, instead
it contains the postal code of the subscriber
who may not be at the incident scene. This
misleading location information might have
caused detection of many people who are far
from the incident calling many other that
are also far from the incident. However, it
is hard to verify this result without knowing
actual locations of callers and people being
called.
Organizational response of the participants and/or coordinators of relief campaigns to a terrorist attack is another important topic. Studying their impact on overall effectiveness on recovery can be analyzed
to improve forensics resilience and preparedness. In Schweinberger et al. (2014), authors study the aftermath effects of the disaster that happened in the U.S. on September 11th, 2001 on the World Trade Center. It focused on the inter-organizational
networks that emerged in response to the
attacks to clarify few questions for helping
develop a plan for future responses to such
similar unexpected disasters. The three important questions are (i) determining the organizations participating in the disaster response and why/how they contribute, (ii)
assessing whether these organizations were
given the coordinator role or emerged as coordinators, and (iii) the ability to absorb disturbances to the disaster response. Bayesian
framework is utilized to provide answers to
the above questions. This framework allows
organizations to collaborate and take respective characteristics (covariates) into account
to determine whether there is an excess of
transitivity using the Bayesian score test.
The dataset is generated from the rescue and
relief operations by the September 11, 2001
attacks Bevc (2010). It includes 717 organizations with two attributes: the scale of
operations categorized as local, state, international, and national, and the type of organization as collective, governmental, nonPage 71
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profit, and profit. Based on the data collected from different sources, it was evident
that small organizations were more collaborative in the disaster response. Network redundancy can help in absorbing the disturbances that reduce the ability to coordinate
in the disaster response. So, the evaluation
of the network redundancy in the form of
transitivity was of prime interest. By evaluating the results performed by the Bayesian
framework, it was concluded that small organizations dominated the inter-organizational
network and a few dominating organizations
behaved as formal coordinators.
There are advantages and disadvantages
of having emergent and formal coordinators
in disaster response. While they may help
to spread information as a point of contact,
they may also become bottleneck for the disaster response. As a result, it was concluded
that formal coordinators cannot take all burden of disaster response. They should be
aware of emergent coordinators and provide
necessary resources for them. While network redundancy may reduce disturbances
to the response, the key coordinators should
be protected and functional for proper to
progress of the response. At last, Bayesian
framework proved to be simple and outperformed other computational models with less
computational time with and without considering covariates. We believe that a similar
framework could also be used for resilience
and preparedness of forensics investigations
as the first responders may collaborate to
response to such catastrophic events when
they occur.

2.7

Influence of
Socio-Economic
Relationships on Crime
and Terror
Drawing a false or unjustified connection
between financial aspects and terrorism
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may lead researchers to incorrect decisions.
Therefore, understanding the causes of terrorism in socio-economical relationships are
essential if an effective strategy is to be
crafted to fight against it. In many cases, the
relationship between the crime and the criminal is directly related to financial, demographic, and ethnic background of the criminals. Thus, we distinguished this section
to include socio-economical relationships of
the criminal and terrorist activities. We
provided summaries and brief insights with
respect to; (i) crime rates affected by ties
among the neighborhoods and the crime and
disorder distribution of the individuals along
with their mobility between the neighborhoods Hipp et al. (2013); Hipp (2010), (ii)
investigation on loss of capital with the influence of social networks Baker & Faulkner
(2004).
In earlier studies, criminologists show that
network ties among neighborhood residents
may impact crime rates. Hipp et al. (2013)
propose to simulate network ties speculatively and construct structural network in
lack of links between pairs in a social environment. They spatially locate the households in a city. Then, they employ spatial
interaction functions and simulate a network
of social ties among these residents. After
building the simulated network environment,
they compute network statistics. Later on,
these statistics are further analyzed in order
to extract the notions of cohesion and information diffusion which underlie theories of
networks and crime.
This study focuses specifically on five
cities in the United States (i.e., Buffalo,
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Sacramento, and
Tucson) for which they aggregated data
on the actual occurrence of reported crime
events between 2000 and 2002. Their combined census data consisted of information
about the number of households in a block
along with the number of persons in each
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household. A limitation of this data was
the induction, a degree of uncertainty regarding to the number of persons in these
units, which they have placed the extra persons randomly throughout the block. Their
results show that these network statistics
are robust predictors of crime levels in several cities. The results on information flow
present a strong negative effect on crime
rates in the models aggregated to small units
(blocks), but a weaker effect in models aggregated to block groups.
Demographic characteristics and regional
closeness can be correlated in order to observe social patterns and criminal activities.
Hipp (2010) proposes a new social distance
measure based on the demographic characteristics of people who live in a region. The
aim of this work is to analyze the crime and
disorder distribution of individuals and mobility between the neighborhoods. The subsample of American Housing Survey (AHS)
- U.S. Census Bureau (2013) was used to
evaluate the social distance between 11 residents of more than 650 blocks for three
time periods. Social distance measure is derived from economic differences, education,
race/ethnicity, and the life course factors as:
K
1 X
|(xik − xjk )Φk |
sdij =
K k=1

(5)

where K is the number of social factors, xik
and xjk are the values of factor k for each
individual i and j, and Φk is the salience
of factor k. After populating a matrix of
social distances based on Equation 5, Hipp
(2010) analyzed the results using a hierarchical model which consists of two levels:
(i) individual parameters and (ii) the microneighborhood measures. The social distance
had a significant effect on crimes and disorder such that more distant individuals of the
society are showing more tendency to get involved in a disorder or a crime.
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Influence of social networks on loss of capital has attracted the attention of economic
sociologists and white-collar criminologists
with opposite views. While economic sociologists claim that social ties benefit the
investors, white-collar criminologists believe
that social ties yield high probability of loss
of capital. Baker & Faulkner (2004) studied a test case on a legitimate business that
committed fraud. An oil and gas enterprise, Fountain Oil & Gas Company (Fountain) with its 230 investors, is used as a case
study. Data was gathered from the District
Attorneys Office of Ventura County, California, and the receiver appointed by the
bankruptcy court. The data include detailed
records of bank accounts, financial transactions, and lists of all properties (including
investor, amount, well, and date) for all investors of Fountain. Later they surveyed
the investors regarding whether they lost or
earned money and the reason of using social
networks (if they used). Total of 72 investors
were interviewed which corresponds to 31%
of the data. As a result, they concluded
that people who do not use social ties (79%
probability of loss) or rely on pre-existing
social ties or prior investors without using
due diligence deal with higher probability of
loss (49%) than people who utilize withinnetwork exchange with due diligence (14%).
In this study, pre-existing social ties played
a beneficial and protective role for investors.
Existing social ties, demographic characteristics, and living nearby expands the
human interactions on both sociologically
and criminally. Socio-economical aspects on
crime and terror reflect invaluable insights
on understanding the spread of crime and
terror within the neighborhoods, friendships
and social networks. Aforementioned studies that are discussed in this section provide
an interesting perspective which has to be
expanded and investigated more deeply.
Page 73

JDFSL V11N4

2.8

A Survey of Social Network Forensics

Summary

With the increase of terrorist activities
around the globe nowadays; it becomes quite
clear that researchers should spend more efforts on understanding both organized crime
and terrorist networks. The crime and terrorist networks are getting more complex
while the diversity of these violent groups are
increasing. Moreover, wide and easy availability of the Internet provides convenient
connectivity not only for the peaceful citizens of the globe, but also provides a common ground for the crime groups by enabling
them to establish worldwide connectivity for
their outreach, recruitment and propaganda
(Weimann, 2004; Farwell, 2014; Archetti,
2015; Tuttle, 2016). Created by innocent intentions, the online social networks became
the playground for these groups where a
broad portfolio of criminal activities are created, shared and operated. Moreover, members of these crime groups became experts
and professionals within the networks. In
order to understand current challenges and
develop countermeasures for these criminals
and their activities, one should put tremendous amount of effort on understanding the
underlying infrastructures of the terrorist
networks on the online social networks.
Previous research studies conducted by
J. N. Shapiro (2005), Tucker (2008), Bjelopera (2012) and Csermely et al. (2013) have
shown that the formation of crime groups
has changed from centralized structure to
cell networks where a small number of people know each other in a huge crime network where these people act more or less
autonomously by the help of digital communication technologies. They have implemented their own networks within the social
networks. Moreover, they created their own
experts for encryption and secure communication.
The studies we have put together in this
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section deliver both complementary and diverging insights on the infrastructure analysis of the activities of organized crime and
terrorist networks from various perspectives.
We believe understanding of these studies
will create awareness as well as help to develop technological advancements for possible countermeasures for law enforcement
agencies.

3. SOCIAL ATTACKS
THROUGH ONLINE
SOCIAL NETWORKS
We define social attacks mediated through
OSNs as attacks that benefit from information available or extracted from OSNs and
might result in loss of property, damage to
property, loss of life, loss of reputation, financial loss, and criminal activity.
Attacks through OSNs are critical as users
may not be aware of the actual person whom
they interact with. Moreover, information
posted or spread through OSNs may adversely affect people’s behavior in their daily
life. While increasing recognition and reputation through OSNs, it is possible that
some sensitive information is also available
to attackers. For example, re-identification
and de-anonymization attacks are possible
for especially identity-theft purposes (Gao
et al., 2011). It is important to understand and categorize these attacks, develop
defenses and protection methods before undesired outcomes occur, and identify attackers in case of criminal activities. There are
responsibilities of OSN users, OSN service
providers, third-party application developers, and friends and relatives of these OSN
users to thwart attacks. We explain possible
types of attacks in this section.
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3.1

Anatomy of Attacks
through Online Social
Networks

We start with explaining how attacks
through online social networks are typically
analyzed and then we provide our way of understanding and categorizing these social attacks for forensics analysis.
3.1.1 Related Work on
Categorization of Attacks
There has been significant amount of work
related to online social networks. In the literature, in general, the security issues and
possible threats are listed and categorized
based on their similarities, outcomes, or
methods used by these attacks. Joe & Ramakrishnan (2014) discuss a survey of various security issues in online social networks
and list a number of security issues resulting from image tagging, email spam attack,
social phishing, and sharing day-to-day activities. It is also possible to see other ways
of categorizing the list of threats or security
issues in the literature.
Attacks are categorized into privacy
breaches, viral marketing, network structural attacks, and malware attacks by Gao
et al. (2011). Privacy breaches may result
from the service provider, other users, or
third party applications. Fire, Goldschmidt,
& Elovici (2014) categorize threats into
classic, modern, combined, and childrenoriented threats. Classic threats include
malware, phishing attacks, spammers, crosssite scripting (XSS), and internet fraud.
Modern attacks include clickjacking, deanonymization attacks, face recognition,
fake profiles, identity clone attacks, inference attacks, information leakage, location
leakage, and socware. Combined attacks
try to exploit both classic and modern attacks to deploy a more sophisticated attack.
Children-oriented attacks target children.
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OSN attacks are also categorized into
forging nodes/identities and forging social
links/connections by (Zhang et al., 2010).
Attackers might be an insider from the OSN
or outsider to disrupt the OSN. Insider attackers might include OSN service provider,
third party application provider, another
user, or anyone who gets access to the network structure.
3.1.2

Categorizing Attacks for
Forensics Analysis

There are numerous types of attacks through
OSNs. Some attacks are sophisticated and
launched as a series of different types of attacks. Categorizing attacks through OSNs is
challenging due to similarities between the
ways those attacks are designed and damages caused by them. This also aggravates
developing a systematic approach of dealing
with these attacks. We start with explaining an OSN in a basic terminology and then
categorize attacks. We believe this way of
categorizing attacks helps forensics analysts
analyze attacks and solve cases.
Attacks benefit from the information
available on or extracted from OSNs, and
use the services of OSNs. As discussed
earlier, an OSN is a graph of vertices and
edges where vertices indicate users and edges
usually indicate relationships between users.
Attackers may try to manipulate users by
creating fake user identities and relationships between users. Each OSN user has
her or his own social profile which could be
visible partially, fully or not visible at all.
Attackers may try to extract unavailable information about a user profile by analzying other attributes of the user, messages
of the user, neighbors of the user, and the
user profile on other OSNs. OSN users may
post or share messages in this network. It
should be noted that the content of OSNs
is also visible to non-members of OSNs at
a level. Messages posted by attackers may
Page 75

JDFSL V11N4
contain fake information or illegal content
and may not only influence registered OSN
users but also passive users of the OSN. OSN
service providers provide APIs to increase
the usability of their services and publicize
anonymized network structure. These APIs
or services could also be used by attackers
to launch their attacks. Search tools provided by OSNs to find users or search messages may also help attackers target specific
population in OSNs and build malicious relationships between OSN users.
Our categorization of social network attacks is based on the OSN structure and information conveyed through OSN networks.
After surveying literature on attacks through
OSNs, we believe that the attacks should be
organized into four levels for an effective and
methodical analysis of these attacks:
1. crime or criminal activity,
2. type of attack,
3. scheme of attack, and
4. attack components.
These four levels of attacks are usually
mixed in the literature and all labeled as attacks. This makes the analysis of attacks
complicated; hence the forensics analysis.
Crime or Criminal Activity. This
level typically involves the outcome of an
attack. Identity-theft, physical threat, burglary, and child pornography are examples
of crimes where online social networks could
be used.
Types of Attacks. There are two types
of attacks that could result in a criminal activity based on the goal of an attack:
1. information disclosure attack and
2. opinion/emotion influence attack.
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In information disclosure attack, the attacker aims to collect personal information about the victim, whereas in opinion/emotion influence attack the attacker
tries to influence the user’s opinion or emotion about a person, a product, or an event
to act in a specific manner. Information disclosure attacks includes both real-world and
cyber-space attacks such as profile-squatting
and reputation slander using identity theft,
phishing, personalized spamming, stalking,
bullying, and corporate espionage (ENISA,
2007). In these attacks, attackers may target a specific part of the population based on
age and sex. Especially, children are likely
to be victims of such attacks. It is possible that opinion/emotion influence attack
can take place after information disclosure
attack. Opinion/emotion influence attacks
could be performed by spreading messages
to targeted or untargeted nodes in the network.
Schemes of Attacks. Schemes of attacks correspond to ways of launching various types of attacks with the purpose of information disclosure or opinion/emotion influence which could lead to a criminal activity. We categorize schemes of attacks
as social engineering (e.g., spam, phishing) and information discovery (e.g., deanonymization).
Attack Components. The schemes of
attacks utilize four attack components:
1. fake nodes/identities,
2. fake relationships,
3. inappropriate/fake messages/posts, and
4. data crawling.
The attackers may utilize the functionalities of OSNs to create fake identities and
build fake relationships with honest users.
Fake messages/posts involve publishing or
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uploading false information on OSNs. However, inappropriate content of a post may
also be problematic and considered as a
crime (e.g., sexual assault streaming (Van
Der Galien, 2017b,a; Moroney et al., 2016)).
Data crawling techniques may involve analyzing the profile of a user in a single or
multiple OSNs, checking relationships with
other users, and analyzing posted messages
to collect information about the user. Social
engineering scheme is likely to create fake
nodes, relationships and messages, whereas
information discovery scheme may extract
information without creating fake nodes and
relationships.
Fake identity attack component is used
in identity-cloning attacks. In other words,
identity clone attack is actually a scheme
of attack that utilizes fake nodes. Information disclosure attacks may be performed by
creating fake identities and relationships in
the network. For example, direct or indirect
information available regarding whereabouts
of a person (e.g., classes taken by a student)
may help stalkers to determine where the attacker is using data crawling attack component leading to information disclosure attack
(Gross & Acquisti, 2005). If a person is away
from home and posts messages from a vacation spot, such information gives hint for
burglars.
We suggest analyzing criminal activities
by asking the following questions:
1. Is the crime result of information disclosure attack, opinion/emotion influence
attack or both?
2. What type of scheme is used to launch
such attack?
3. Which attack components are used for
developing the scheme of attack?
We believe that once these questions are
answered effectively, forensics analysis could
be performed adequately.
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We organize the rest of this section as
follows. We firstly cover social engineering
scheme and then explain information discovery scheme. We have dedicated a special section for children-oriented attacks. The categories and sub-categories of papers studied
in the following sections are provided in Table 3.

3.2

Social Engineering Scheme

Social engineering scheme is a critical type
of attack as the attacker manipulates the
victim to provide the information to the
attacker or to act in a specific manner.
Social engineering scheme could be used
for both information disclosure and opinion/emotion influence attacks. Social engineering scheme may utilize fake nodes,
fake relationships, and fake messages. After
providing general social engineering attacks,
we briefly look into fake identity/messaging,
and spam/malware/social bot attacks.
3.2.1

General Social Engineering
Attacks

Social engineering attacks are categorized
into phishing, dumpster diving (attack using discarded items), shoulder surfing (information obtained by viewing over someone’s shoulder), reverse social engineering
(attacks where victims are lured to contact attackers), waterholing (setting a trap
for the victim to visit a compromised web
site), advanced persistent threat (usually
internet-based espionage attacks), and baiting (malware infected storage medium to be
found by victims) (Krombholz et al., 2015).
Such attacks have been successful in compromising Google’s internal system in 2009
(Zetter, 2010), breaking the RSA security token system in 2011 (RSA, 2011), compromising Facebook in 2013 (Schwartz, 2013), obtaining NY Times employees credentials in
2013 (Perlroth, 2013), and obtaining Paypal’s credit card numbers using phishing
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Table 3. Overview of studies on social attacks and protection
Paper

Category

Sub-category

Irani, Balduzzi, et al. (2011)

social engineering

reverse social engineering

Huber, Mulazzani, Weippl, et al. (2011)

social engineering

fake messaging&insecure communication

Goga et al. (2015)

social engineering

identity cloning

Jin et al. (2011)

social engineering

identity cloning

Bilge et al. (2009)

social engineering

profile cloning

Garg & Nilizadeh (2013)

social engineering

spam

Brown et al. (2008)

social engineering

spam

Misener (2011)

social engineering

social bot

W. Xu et al. (2010)

social engineering

malware

Heymann et al. (2007)

social engineering

spam

Viswanath et al. (2014)

social engineering

fake identity

Guillory & Hancock (2016)

social engineering

deception

Squicciarini & Griffin (2014)

social engineering

deception

Griffin & Squicciarini (2012)

social engineering

deception

Alowibdi et al. (2014)

social engineering

deception

Yan et al. (2011)

social engineering

malware

Wagner et al. (2012)

social engineering

social bots

Nash et al. (2013)

social engineering

information diffusion

Myers et al. (2012)

social engineering

information diffusion

Weng et al. (2013)

social engineering

information diffusion

Dong et al. (2011)

social engineering

fake relationships

(Backstrom et al., 2007)

information discovery

de-anonymization

Wondracek et al. (2010)

information discovery

de-anonymization

Ding et al. (2010)

information discovery

de-anonymization

Nilizadeh et al. (2014)

information discovery

de-anonymization

Narayanan & Shmatikov (2009)

information discovery

de-anonymization

Sweeney (2002)

information discovery

neighborhood

Chester & Srivastava (2011)

information discovery

neighborhood

Dey et al. (2012)

information discovery

attribute disclosure

M. Li et al. (2014)

information discovery

location disclosure

Irani, Webb, et al. (2011)

information discovery

identity disclosure (multiple OSNs)

Z. Yang et al. (2014)

information discovery

sybil

Seigfried-Spellar et al. (2012)

children-oriented

child pornography (laws)

Wolak et al. (2010)

children-oriented

online predators

Seigfried-Spellar (2013)

children-oriented

child pornography

Huitsing et al. (2012)

children-oriented

bullying

Vermande et al. (2000)

children-oriented

bullying

Murphy (2012)

children-oriented

children (detecting)

Penna et al. (2010)

children-oriented

online gaming
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emails (SocialEngineer, n.d.). Viral marketing attacks may also use social engineering scheme and come in the form of spams,
phishing and account attacks. Since significant information is available on online social networks, phishing attacks are four times
likely to be successful if it appears to be coming from a known person rather than an unknown person (Jagatic et al., 2007). Designing attacks through fake messages and relationships increases the success of such attacks.
While in traditional social engineering, an
attacker may directly communicate with the
victim, in Reverse Social Engineering (RSE),
the victims are tricked into contacting the
attackers (Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011).
Irani, Balduzzi, et al. (2011) categorize reverse social attacks into recommender-based,
demographics-based, and visitor trackingbased attacks. In recommender-based RSE,
the goal of the attacker is to influence the
recommender of the online social network to
be a possible candidate (friend) for the victim. In demographics-based RSE, the attacker creates a fake profile for establishing
friendships based on profile similarities (e.g.,
dating sites). In visitor tracking-based RSE,
the attacker visits the profile of the victim.
When the OSN displays information about
who has visited the victim’s profile, the victim may visit the attacker’s profile and contact the attacker.
Social engineering attacks can also be categorized as targeted and untargeted (Irani,
Balduzzi, et al., 2011). In a targeted attack, the attacker has a specific user as a
victim whereas in an untargeted attack the
attacker tries to reach as many users as possible. Moreover, attacks can also be categorized as direct and mediated (Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011). In direct attacks, the attacker may post messages where the victim
can see directly. In mediated attacks, the attacker uses an intermediate agent to bait the
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user to himself or herself. Irani, Balduzzi, et
al. (2011) analyzed possible victims by creating fake profiles. For example, an attractive
female photo on a profile is a bait for young
people for seeking relationships.
To analyze social engineering attacks, the
entities (e.g., environment, attacker, trick
and victim) need to be identified and their
roles should be investigated (Algarni et al.,
2013). Algarni et al. (2013) examine social engineering threats on social networking sites and inquire the questions of “which
entities exist and how do they effect social
engineering in social networking sites?” It is
concluded in their study that the success of
social engineering attacks is affected by the
characteristics of four main entities: the online social network (the environment), the
social engineer (the attacker), the plan and
technique (the trick), and the online social
network user (the victim).
3.2.2

Fake Identity and Messaging
Scheme

It is possible for attackers to create fake identities and messages in OSNs. Fake identity
could be used for both information disclosure and opinion/emotion influence, whereas
fake messages are typically used for opinion/emotion influence. Fake identity attacks
create unreal fake nodes and enhance the attack with fake relationships. When attackers want to influence other users by posting
false content, they use fake messaging attack
component. Some attack schemes could be
directly based on attack components.
Deception through providing partially incorrect information in profiles is a special
type of fake identity scheme. As DePaulo
et al. (1996) describes, deception is a fact of
the life. Deception is an act with an intent
to mislead others without getting noticed by
them, and deception became especially critical when examining social media services in
which the borders between victims and dePage 79
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ceiving others are mostly hazy (Alowibdi et
al., 2014). Users may provide partially true
information as well as false data about themselves. Some users may lie about their critical attributes such as gender, age (Alowibdi
et al., 2014). Attackers may utilize specific
attributes to establish their attacks. One of
the major challenges for deception analysis is
determining the actual motivation of deception and separating unintentional incorrect
information from intentional false information to get benefit from other users. When
information provided by OSN users is not
true, it is important to determine the reasons for false information. Users may provide false information since personal information could be accessible by undesired people. Another reason is that users would like
to have good social images. The most critical
false information representation is deceiving
others to get unfair benefits or abuse others. Such detection of deception is critical
for forensics analysts.
Fake Messaging. Spread of fake news
through online social networks caused a man
to set fire at a restaurant which he thought
that it was a center of child-sex trafficking (Kang & Goldman, 2016). Google and
Facebook have started to take steps to deal
with fake news since the end of 2016 (Wakabayashi & Isaac, 2017), and only time will
tell whether if it will be a success. Validating
truth of messages is a very complicated issue.
At least, OSN service providers may put effort in labeling messages related to crimes.
Human interactions may also influence
how messages are spread in OSNs. Weng
et al. (2013) analyze the Yahoo! Meme
dataset between 2009 and 2010, where
they try to observe different strategies
that users adopt for interacting with others. The authors characterize users and
use different parameters which are approximated by Maximum-Likelihood Estimation
(MLE) (Cowan, 1998). Triadic closure was
Page 80

A Survey of Social Network Forensics
considered as the major preferred method for
forming connections among users. Triadic
closure is used when user A follows user B
and user B follows user C. Overtime, it is
observed that user A follows user C as he or
she keeps observing messages from user C.
In their paper, the authors observed that, in
the early stages, triadic closure is very dominant. However, in later stages, it was observed that information diffusion in the network plays a major role in causing people to
interact with each other.
It is important to analyze how information is spread in OSNs to deal with fake message diffusion. Myers et al. (2012) present a
model where users can reach information either through social network links or through
external sources. Then, their model is applied to URL emergence in Twitter network
and evaluated over one month of traces from
Twitter. The authors analyze the effect of
external sources over information diffusion
among people. It is observed that 71% of
the information in Twitter is caused by information diffusion, whereas the rest of the
information comes from external sources.
OSN providers should provide additional
control mechanisms for checking the authenticity of messages. Huber, Mulazzani,
Weippl, et al. (2011) devised friend-in-themiddle (FITM) attack (when privacy settings are at high levels to avoid spams) by
basing their attack on insecure communication between the user and OSN. They
have developed friend injection to become
a member of a target network, application
injection to obtain profile content, and social engineering to exploit gathered information. They highly recommend that OSN service providers use HTTPS instead of HTTP
for all communication exchanges to thwart
FITM attacks.
Identity Cloning. Impersonation which
is a type of identity cloning attack disrupts
the trust among OSN users. Identity cloning
c 2016 ADFSL

A Survey of Social Network Forensics
attacks can be categorized into celebrity impersonation attacks, social engineering attacks, and doppleganger bot attacks (Goga
et al., 2015). In celebrity impersonation attack, the attacker imitates the profile of a famous person by attaining his/her followers.
In social engineering attack, the attacker exploits victim’s friends to obtain sensitive information about the victim. The doppelganger bot attack is impersonation of an ordinary person and likely to be used to influence other users by providing reviews or
other information. Since the profile is realistic, it is not detectable by sybil or spam defenders. They analyze profile similarity, social neighborhood overlap, time overlap between accounts, and differences between accounts to detect impersonating accounts using support vector machines (SVM) classifier.
Attackers developed enhanced methods of
identity cloning by carefully setting privacy
attributes. Jin et al. (2011) propose detection of faked identities based on attribute
similarity in profiles and similarity of friend
networks. When attacker creates a fake identity, the attacker may not only duplicate actual victim data but may also benefit from
privacy settings. For example, a fake profile may keep the birth date and college as
private while the victim profile keep them as
public which makes the fake identity more
realistic. Moreover, their method also considers the possibility of attacker trying to
add a subset of actual friends of the victim,
recommended list of friends, excluded set of
friends, or combination of these. They apply
a number of similarity measures on profiles
and friend networks for detecting fake identities. However, the validation is not an easy
task.
Identity cloning attacks could also be categorized whether identity cloning is based on
the same OSN or multiple OSNs. Bilge et
al. (2009) categorize attacks from identity
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cloning attacks as same-site profile cloning
and cross-site profile cloning attacks. In
same-site cloning, an attacker duplicates the
profile of a user and sends messages to become friends with that user’s friends in the
same OSN. In cross-site profile attacks, an
attacker creates a profile of the victim in another OSN where the victim is not registered
yet, and the attacker sends messages to become friends with the victim’s friends.
Profile Deception. There are various
forms of deceptions. While Turner et al.
(1975) categorize deception into lies, exaggerations, half-truths, secrets, and diversionary responses, Utz (2005) takes another approach in computer-mediated communication and categorizes deception into category
deception (gender switching), attractiveness
deception, or identity concealment. Since
true identity of social media users may not
be known, it is possible that innocent people may be deceived or abused through misbehavior of deceptive users. Predicting attributes of social media users may help to
protect regular users as well as identify perpetrators.
As social networking sites provide more
convenient ways of communications and relationships,they also make the deception easier. Walther (1996) points out that people
take advantage of computer-mediated communication environments to enhance their
self-presentation and inflate other people’s
view about themselves. In addition, Buller
& Burgoon (1996) propose Interpersonal Deception Theory, which defines deception as
an intentional act in which senders knowingly transmit messages that aim to foster
a false belief or interpretation by the receiver. On the other hand, according to some
other researchers, deception is not always intentional (e.g., self-deception) (Gardner &
Martinko, 1988), (Jones et al., 1962), (A. Li
& Bagger, 2006). Regardless of the deception type, successful forensics investigation
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requires detection of deception.
Guillory & Hancock (2016) study how
people use deception to enhance selfpresentation. In their experiment, they investigate how users’ social connections affect
the way they use deception in their resume
profiles. For instance, people feel more comfortable to lie in an environment where others do not know them. However, it is less
likely for people to lie in an environment
where they have several friends due to the
fear of being caught. Moreover, the authors
also predict that the users would be reluctant
to lie about objective information such as education or work places for enhancing their
self-presentation since such objective information could be verified as either truthful
or deceptive by their network connections.
On the other hand, subjective information
such as interests, hobbies, etc. is more difficult to be verified as deceptive. Thus, people
would lie more about such subjective information. They have setup experiments where
undergraduate students are split into three
groups to create their resumes for a consultant position. First group was asked to
create their resumes in an MS Word document. Second group was asked to create a
completely private resume on LinkedIn that
only user and researchers could access. The
third group was asked to create a public
LinkedIn resume. Just after all the resumes
were created, the researchers revealed the actual purpose of the study. The students then
were asked to identify all lies on the resumes
and asked to provide the truthful version of
them. The results of this work show that the
number of lies that students told did not differ among those three groups. On the other
hand, the type of lies differed among the
three groups. The students in the first group
tend to lie more about objective information,
e.g., responsibilities, than the students in the
second group. On the other hand, the students in the third group lied more about subPage 82
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jective information (interests, hobbies). This
study shows that forensics investigators need
to develop methods or search tools to verify subjective information. This may eventually help them detect criminals/perpetrators
who commit crimes via lies.
Identifying cases when online users are
likely to deceive or provide false information
may help to determine credibility of information. Squicciarini & Griffin (2014) investigate the problem of deception in online sites
by analyzing the posts of a forum to determine why and how honest users engage in
deceptive activities. A game theoretic approach was proposed to understand users’
behaviors based on three cases: (i) peer pressure, (ii) a potential reward, and (iii) comfort level. It is shown that users will play a
coordination game to minimize social stress
by choosing a level of deception. Prior to
examination of forum posts, they conducted
an online survey on undergraduate students
who have many social network interactions.
The purpose was to get an insight on when,
how and why users deceive. It was asked
whether they would withhold information,
tell the truth, or lie about their age, job,
GPA, location, phone, etc. The results of
the survey show that users’ tendency to deceive for data types is not mainly for privacy
concerns, but it is highly correlated with the
desire to portray a successful social image.
Furthermore, it is shown that lying in social networks and withholding information
are two different actions. In addition, it is
shown that deceit actions are influenced by
inner-circle users. In the analysis of the forum posts, 3.7M posts of 21K users were filtered down to 1,400 users who had at least
one infraction. 356 users had at least 2 infractions. The infractions are identified by
the website and other users’ comments about
the user’s activities. One of the conclusions
of their research is that deceptive users are
not only hard to identify but they are also
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influential and affect other users to do deceptive actions. Based on this study, it can also
be argued that criminals may affect other
people with or without criminal inclination
to commit crimes. Therefore, similar study
may also be adapted to search for such promotive users.
Social sites request certain information to
be provided by their users upon the registration process. Users usually try to minimize the amount of information they provide
which they think might reduce their identification on the internet. This however, raises
security and privacy issues. Griffin & Squicciarini (2012) develop a deception model
which uses game theory to detect users’ willingness to release, withhold or lie about their
information. In their work, a preliminary
model of deception is designed using a game
theory. In this model, it is intended to show
the complexity of information revelation in
OSNs. Misrepresentation in three cases are
also examined. These cases are truthful information disclosure, withholding information, and deception. Data was collected from
users through surveys. The information that
was aimed to help users gain (i) privacy
awareness, (ii) attitude toward information
withholding and practices, and (iii) attitude
toward lies and misrepresentation. The tendency of a user to lie seems to be highly correlated with users’ desire to show a good social image as discussed above (Squicciarini &
Griffin, 2014), and the tendency is not very
related to users’ privacy concerns.
3.2.3

Spam, Malware and Social Bot
Attacks

For categorization of users into spammers,
bots, cyborgs, and fake users based on their
behavior, the interested readers may study
the survey by (Tuna et al., 2016). In this
section, we provide a brief overview of how
attacks of such users can be launched as
spams, malware, and bots rather than focusc 2016 ADFSL
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ing on user behavior. Spread of fake messaging through information diffusion also helps
success of such attacks.
Spam Attacks. Social engineering attacks can be performed through spams, and
there could be correlation between the network attackers or spammers and financial
and cultural features of a society (Garg &
Nilizadeh, 2013). The main type of attack for spams is opinion/emotion influence.
Social spammers may not only launch attacks to spread ads but may also disseminate pornography, viruses or befriend victims, steal personal information (Bilge et
al., 2009), and destroy a system’s reputation (Lee et al., 2010). Fake messages are
the main attack component for spam attacks
and can be strengthened by fake identity and
relationships.
Social engineering attacks through propagating spams on OSNs such as Twitter
and Facebook or through websites such as
Craigslist is very common. Even though
there are some analysis tools and filtering
techniques, in general it is not enough to prevent such spams. Thus, it is crucial to detect the spam messages and spammers. Garg
& Nilizadeh (2013) investigate if financial,
structural and cultural features of a society
explain the actual reasons behind Craigslistbased crimes across 30 American cities. The
authors focused on cars+trucks category of
Craigslist with two subcategories: by-owner
and by-dealer. Furthermore, flagged advertisements by Craigslist were considered, and
the ads were classified according to the city.
Shapiro-Wilk test (S. S. Shapiro & Wilk,
1965) and null hypothesis techniques suggest that the number of people in the cities
are not related with the number and percentage of flagged ads. Also, income per
capita is substantially related with the online scam exposure and it suggests that when
education level and income increase, the percentage of exposure to online scams also inPage 83
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creases.
Context-aware spam is defined as a spam
that is highly likely to be clickable due
to authentic social connections (Brown et
al., 2008). They are usually categorized as
relationship-based (using only friendship information), unshared-attribute (using an attribute from one of the parties in the relationship), and shared attribute (using a visible attribute to both parties in the relationship) based attacks. Brown et al. (2008)
show that people with private profiles are
vulnerable to spam as much as other users.
Similar to spams, especially fraud diffusion may economically hurt many people.
Nash et al. (2013) combine social network
analysis and diffusion theory to study a fraud
that spread in British Columbia, Canada,
defrauding 2,285 investors for loss of 240 million dollars. The diffusion of fraud is studied from the point of view of victims who
invested in the fraudulent scheme. Illegal innovations are typically studied with respect
to the offenders adopting novel crime techniques, not crime victims. The purpose of
their study is two-fold. First, they assess
whether there is empirical evidence of diffusion in the spread of the fraud. Second,
they examine the nature of the relationship
between victims and the individuals who influenced them to invest in order to determine the relative importance of opinion leaders who influenced their friends and family into investing, and industry professionals and mass media channels in spreading
the fraud. By analyzing the fraud from a
social network perspective, they show how
the fraud diffused through short chains from
multiple anchor points, including victims
who unknowingly became agents of diffusion in their own victimization network. The
data for this study are drawn from a victim survey of the investment and securities
fraud orchestrated by Eron Mortgage Corporation. To identify the number of friends
Page 84

A Survey of Social Network Forensics
and family who nominated specific individuals as a source of influence, they used indegree centrality. They have shown that an
illegal innovation spreads through word of
mouth, change agents, opinion leaders, and
network bridges. This study confirms the
importance of applying social network methods to diffusion research, including diffusion
of criminal innovations in order to take the
technical skills of criminals into account.
Malware and Social Bot Attacks.
Malware attacks may create accounts, join
groups, and post messages on OSNs. Malware software can be used as an attack using worms such as Koobface (W. Xu et
al., 2010) and cross-site forgery (Fitzgerald,
2009). Malware attacks can post unwanted
messages on the walls of users. Fake messaging is the main tool for such attacks. Similarly, fake identity and relationships may increase the probability of being prone to malware attacks. Social bots may attack OSN
users to spread information or to influence
opinions of users (Misener, 2011).

3.3

Information Discovery
Scheme

In information discovery scheme, the major goal is to identify users using the network structure and available information
from user profiles. Information discovery
scheme is suitable for information disclosure
attacks and could be used for identity-theft
purposes. OSN users may not be aware
how much information could be revealed by
just sharing a small amount of information.
For example, it is possible to identify demographics information, face photo identification, or social security number for identity
theft purposes (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). 5digit ZIP code, gender, and date of birth
information together is satisfactory to identify around 87% of the U.S. population using
1990 U.S. census data (Sweeney, L., 2000),
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whereas this percentage has gone down to
63% for 2000 U.S. census (Golle, 2006),
which is still quite high. Data crawlingbased attacks may use information from a
single OSN or multiple OSNs and may target specific attributes of victims.
The information discovery scheme may
use the available information from OSNs
or may create fake nodes and relationships
to reveal the identities in a network. We
briefly discuss de-anonymization, neighborhood, and attribute closure in this section
under information discovery scheme.
3.3.1

De-anonymization using
Network Structure and
Similarity

Attacks to reveal the privacy of users by
identifying their connections are categorized
as active and passive attacks (Backstrom et
al., 2007). In an active attack, the attacker
creates a number of accounts and a subnetwork and tries to communicate with users.
When this small network becomes the target network, the locations of victim users
can be identified by using the connections
in that network. In passive attack, the attacker forms a coalition with a number of
users and use their neighborhood information to compromise the privacy of users in
their network. Wondracek et al. (2010) use
(browser) history stealing to identify group
memberships and show that group memberships are satisfactory to uniquely identify or
de-anonymize an individual.
De-anonymization attack can also be categorized into mapping-based and guessing
based approaches (Ding et al., 2010). While
mapping-based approaches use the background knowledge of known users with their
IDs to map vertices in released anonymized
data, guessing methods may target a user
in released data to determine one or more
of known users by matching released data
against known users. Nilizadeh et al. (2014)
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show that existing de-anonymization methods can be enhanced by first dividing the
network into communities, mapping communities, enriching seeds within communities, and global propagation by mapping remaining nodes. Their divide-andconquer method is able to map 40% of
nodes for Twitter dataset of 90K nodes
with 20% edge noise and 16 seeds whereas
the base Narayanan-Shimatikov technique
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2009) could almost not map any.
Sybil attacks are an example of attacks
that could be used as a social engineering scheme as well as information discovery scheme. In sybil attacks, the attacker
may launch accounts (from as small as seven
to thousands depending on the purpose)
for de-anonymization (information disclosure) or manipulating voting results (opinion/emotion influence) (Gao et al., 2011).
Z. Yang et al. (2014) found that 80% of sybil
nodes do not necessarily form its own network and they just try to build relationships
with normal users. Their analysis shows that
edges between sybil nodes are formed unintentionally by the time. They also found out
that sybil nodes without explicit social ties
may act together to spread spam.
3.3.2

Neighborhood Attacks

Neighborhood attack is a way of reidentification of a victim by obtaining some
information about the neighbors of a victim using anonymized networks which are
expected to preserve the privacy of users. In
the k-anonymity model, it is expected that
an individual cannot be identified with a
probability more than 1/k in an anonymized
network (Sweeney, 2002). Sweeney (2002)
proposes a neighborhood extraction and coding method to satisfy k-anonymity with
small anonymization cost by changing labels
and adding edges.
While most of the studies are done to prePage 85
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vent the attacks on identifying user, analyzing attribute disclosure attack that targets sensitive information has also been
needed. Chester & Srivastava (2011) provide α-proximity measure to capture the susceptibility of a network for attribute disclosure attack. The social network is considered
as an undirected, simple, and vertex-labeled
graph.α-proximity measure is defined based
on the label distribution of vertices in the
graph. An algorithm is designed to make
the graph α-proximal that converts a vertexlabeled graph G into an α-proximal graph
with a number of additional edges. Basically, their main goal is to make sure that
by gaining an access to a specific part of the
network an attacker should not be able to
predict sensitive information. For example,
assume that network nodes are labeled with
respect to having some disease or not. If
there are sub-graphs having mostly diseases,
it will be easy to predict that members of
that neighborhood have disease if there is an
access to that neighborhood in the graph. To
make sure that attackers cannot predict that
type of sensitive information, the label distribution of a neighborhood in a graph with
labeled nodes should be similar to the entire
graph.
Some information from user or neighbor
profiles could indirectly identify specific attributes of OSN users. Dey et al. (2012)
show that it is possible to estimate the age
of users on Facebook by analyzing friend’s
ages, ages of friends of friends, and so on.
They show it is possible to estimate ages
with an error of a few years for highly private
users who do not share friend list in public.
Using high school graduation years of users
and their friends reveal helpful information
about the birth years of users.
3.3.3

Attribute Disclosure Attacks

Some attributes can be predicted based on
the interactions and services provided by
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OSNs. Location-based social networks that
help to find friends with spatial proximity
have other types of vulnerabilities and the
most important of them is that the location of users can be revealed. M. Li et al.
(2014) show that using 30 volunteers and 3week data, their attack method can detect
top 5 locations of a user with high accuracy.
The attacker may generate 3 fake anchor
locations and applies iterative trilateration
method using distances to three locations.
The attacker further applies space partition
to increase its accuracy.
Since users may have accounts on multiple
OSNs, information available (or social footprint) from multiple OSNs may reveal the
identity and attributes of a person. Irani,
Webb, et al. (2011) show that while physical
identification can be successful around 34%
using information from a single social network, the physical identification attack may
be successful around 90% when information
from six or more profiles is used. They
also state that the similar success percentages are obtained for password-recovery attacks. Narayanan & Shmatikov (2009) show
that it is possible to de-anonymize thousands
of users by using information from multiple OSNs which users have registered. They
show that users who are verified to have accounts on both Flickr and Twitter can be
identified with 12% error rate by just analyzing the network structure without creating dummy sybil nodes.

3.4

Children-Oriented Attacks

Children may be victims in social networks
or online games. Child abuse and child
pornography (CP) is one of the major crimes
today, and the online communication does
not necessarily protect minors. It is useful to recall the development of CP laws
in the US and in the world (SeigfriedSpellar et al., 2012). After that, we present
threats for children by briefly looking at
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profiles of online predators (Wolak et al.,
2010; Seigfried-Spellar, 2013), cyberbullying
(Huitsing et al., 2012), detecting children
(Murphy, 2012), and risk of online games
(Penna et al., 2010).
3.4.1

Legal Aspects

Seigfried-Spellar et al. (2012) review the development of child pornography (CP) laws
and criminalizing by US constitutions and
report the issues of the laws as well as the
techniques to block such uses and distributions. Since 1950s obscene pornographic materials were accepted illegal by the courts in
the USA. And CP is an obscene expression
of speech and is not protected by the First
Amendment. In 1970s, the congress declared
that CP is shifted from “cottage” to “organized abuse.” Child Protection Act 1984 considered CP as “lascivious” and illegal when
it focuses on the clothed genital region of
children despite the lack of nudity. In 1990,
some courts decided that private possession
of CP is also illegal- not sharing does not
make it legal. In 1996, virtual images of children are also considered as CP. CP currently
carries maximum 30 years with minimum 15
years of imprisonment. Internet providers
who do not willingly report CP incidents are
fined $50K for the first time and $100K for
subsequent incidents. They are responsible
for reporting to NCMEC (National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children). The
European Union involves 27 countries that
prohibit the CP, and there is an argument on
whether filtering the sites by tools or removing the whole websites is the right solution.
3.4.2

Threats for Children

The harm after using online activities is categorized as harm from content (disseminating pornographic or harmful content about
the child), harm by contact (the child targeted for participating in sexual abuse, being photographed, and disseminated), and
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harm by conduct (uploading harmful material or physically meeting with an adult)
by (UNICEF Office of Research, 2011).
These threats for children may involve online
predators, risky behavior, and cyberbullying
(Fire, Kagan, et al., 2014).
Online Predators. While identifying
criminals for OSN-initiated crimes, it should
be noted that these criminals do not necessarily use fake identities such as representing themselves as children. Wolak et al.
(2010) analyzed internet-initiated sex crimes
and found out that the victims who were
teenagers aged 13 to 17 knew that they
were communicating with an adult, could
lead to a physical meeting and engage in
a sexual activity. Hence, internet-initiated
sex crimes are not necessarily a result of
online deceptive information. In another
study, Seigfried-Spellar (2013) reports some
statistics from previous studies on different
preferences of child pornography consumers,
and investigates measuring the preference of
these consumers. Previous statistics by Internet Watch Foundation reports that 69%
of child victims are under 10 years old, 24%
are under 6 years old, and 4% are under 2
years old. Canadian center for child protection examined about 35K websites. Over
half of the images were from under 8 years
old. 68.9% of them were sadistic and 83%
included females. A survey question was
created, and volunteers (CP users) from social networks and websites were invited to
rate their content preference on child pornographic images: toddler, poses, violence,
etc. Respondents rated their opinions as (i)
strongly do not prefer, (ii) do not prefer, (iii)
indifferent, (iv) prefer, and (v) strongly prefer. The collected survey data was limited to
2 individuals, which cannot provide statistically significant conclusions. However, there
were notable descriptive differences in the
types of images preferred by these CP users.
In general, one of the respondents appeared
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to prefer pornographic images of teens, regardless of whether the child was posing in
a nonsexual or sexually provocative manner,
while the other one preferred a wider-range
of sexually explicit image content.
Cyberbullying. Cyberbullying is not
rare, as an online survey shows that 12% of
parents state that their kids are exposed to
cyberbullying based on data from 24 countries (Ipsos, 2012). Unfortunately, cyberbullying may result in committing suicide
(Dean, 2012; Pearce, 2013). The use of online social networks at K-12 schools may be
analyzed to understand and prevent psychological attacks such as bullying. Huitsing
et al. (2012) examine whether the association between victimization and psychological adjustment is moderated by the classroom network position of bullies and victims. They test the effects of the social
structure of bullying and victimization networks to see how it is correlated with two
psychological adjustment variables: depression and self-esteem. In order to assess the
structure of these networks, they use measures of centralization. Degree centralization is used to measure the importance of
a student in the network. If the centralization of a classroom is high, then it is more
likely that only a few students are central.
The authors first examined how victims behave if bullying is common in that classroom.
If the victimization is not a common event,
then the victims tend to blame themselves.
They collected the data via internet-based
questionnaires from 78 Finland schools, involving 429 classrooms and a total of 8248
students in grades 3-5 (mean ages in 1012). They measured depression and selfesteem of the students by asking them questions. Participants responded on a 5-point
Likert-type scale. They used victimization,
sex, and age as the independent variables
describing the students. As for the independent variables describing the classrooms,
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they used classroom averages of victimization and bullying. In order to collect this
data, they used peer nominations. To calculate the classroom centralization of victimization and bullying, they used the normalized degree variance. The degree variance
is used to measure the heterogeneity of students. Analyses showed that boys were reported to be somewhat more victimized than
girls, whereas girls were somewhat more depressed than boys. No sex differences were
found for self-esteem or age. It was also
found that boys and younger children were
less depressed than girls and older children.
Vermande et al. (2000) also show that such
central social network structures of classroom are typical bullying and victimization
networks. They examine the dispersal of
bullying and victimization in classrooms by
examining the centralization of victimization
and bullying in the classroom.
Detecting Children by Images.
Available images in profiles may help online
predators detect children. Murphy (2012)
shows that humans can predict the ages of
children and distinguish the juvenile and
adults; and it is not just common sense
but it is decided by preconscious condition
of human experience on estimating on the
facial features and proportions. Studies
show that people can estimate ages of
subjects which are in 20-54 with 2.39 years
deviation. Old faces age slower than young
faces. Thus, estimating ages of old people is
more error-prone. In other words, predicting
a young person’s age is easier than of an old
one (e.g., 5 years old will not be guessed as
15 years old, but 35 years old person could
be guessed as 45). In this study, several
surveys were deployed. The first part of the
survey had some images from websites and
the task was to identify whether the image
belonged to an adult or a kid. At least
90% of respondents predicted correctly. In
the second part users had to order (sort)
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the photos of a person when the person
was between 6 years and 16 years old. For
two sets of photos, the accuracy is between
74% and 99% for 167 respondents. The
respondents commented that they used the
size of shoulders and proportion of facial
features to decide. Another survey was
completed by 107 people and the goal was
to estimate the ages of 47 subjects whose
ages were between 0 and 25. Survey respondents were quite accurate on predicting
the ages. However, the prediction accuracy
decreased while reaching the adolescence
and it increased again after adulthood.
Majority of estimations for under age of
18 was higher than the real age, which
implies that if the criminal examiner has a
reasonable doubt that the image may not
be under age, then the image should not be
considered for criminal charges.
Risk of Online Gaming Networks.
Protection of children is very important as
they are usually interested in playing online
games with people who may portray themselves as someone else. Penna et al. (2010)
present an approach about safety for children who are playing online games. Their
approach proposes to monitor and detect relationships forming with a child in online
games. If an offline meeting has been arranged with the child or it has the potential to occur, system will give an alert according to relationship. The system was installed on the child’s computer with the local
Windows account name provided by parents.
Communications and event data were stored
in a database. Some indicators and tokens
of physical locations or meetings being arranged were searched on the stored data. If
messages were detected as suspicious, then
system gave alert to the parents via email or
other report output. Test data was collected
from the researchers’ personal game play experience (World of Warcraft: WOW) and
online communications (1,191 hours over 3.5
c 2016 ADFSL

JDFSL V11N4
years). The prototype database included
118,230 chat messages and 922 aliases. Real
data was used to assist in the creation of
the framework including strings, rules, and
regular expressions. In their experiments,
the prototype successfully achieved its objectives by outputting suspicious scenarios and
highlighting them with high ranks.

3.5

Summary

There are many types of OSN-initiated attacks covered in the literature. Categorization of attacks in the literature focuses on
the similarity of attacks and damages. Such
categorization methods have limitations for
forensics analysts since these methods do not
help forensic analysts develop a systematic
way of solving cases. We have proposed categorization of attacks into four levels: crime
or criminal attacks, type of attack, scheme
of attack, and attack components. Our categorization helps to separate crimes which
could be outcome of information disclosure
or opinion/emotion influence and could be
launched using social engineering and information discovery schemes. These schemes
utilize fake nodes, fake relationships, inappropriate/fake messages/posts, and data
crawling.
Forensics analysts should be aware of the
fact that attackers can establish various
forms of attacks. Knowing existing attacks
and learning how to prevent damages caused
by these attacks may help law enforcement
personnel take necessary precautions for new
types of attacks. Especially, understanding
children-oriented attacks, developing an effective legal framework for OSNs, and monitoring activities of children will help to protect minors in our society.
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4. FORENSICS
ANALYSIS AND
DEFENSE METHODS
FOR SOCIAL ATTACKS
Protecting OSN users and identifying criminal activities and criminals are important
for forensics analysts. The defense methods
should make sure that identities, relationships, and messages are authentic. Moreover, users should not reveal private information carelessly and OSN service providers
should ascertain that user information is not
revealed by de-anonymization attacks. The
three methods suggested for dealing with
spams by (Heymann et al., 2007) can be generalized for developing defense methods for
social attacks: prevention, detection, and demotion. Prevention methods should guarantee that the identities belong to real people, relationships among identities are real,
and messages that are posted are verified if
needed. Moreover, OSN service providers
should not allow information leakage and
users should be informed about possible unintentional data closure. Detection methods may allow creation of new identities,
relationships, and posting messages. Once
these entities are created, the detection system tries to validate them. The demotion
method may rank identities, relationships,
and messages and assigns a score or rank so
that users can protect themselves. While the
strength and frequency of security measures
such as Captchas may help to deal with some
of the attacks (Bilge et al., 2009), user awareness is critical for dealing with attacks (Gao
et al., 2011) as there is a trade-off employing
security measures and user friendliness.
In order to protect users from social attacks, the security of OSN users should
be improved by privacy preservation techniques. In this section, we categorize privacy
preservation techniques into wrapper-based,
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access control, and methods that increase
user awareness. We explain specific methods
that will help forensics analysts identify fake
identities, fake messages, and fake relationships and protect users from malicious users,
messages, and relationships. Finally, we provide a brief overview of studies on searching traces of OSN data from devices of OSN
users to support forensics investigations.

4.1

Privacy Preservation
Methods

Private information includes personal sensitive information, the relationships of users,
locations that users visit, the location of user
homes, temporal data such as time-of-day,
a specific date, or a special occasion about
users. Attacks based on data crawling methods may reveal private information about
users. Quantifying, measuring, and evaluating privacy are some of the most difficult
tasks in social networks. Measures for for
determining disclosure of privacy (Y. Wang
& Nepali, 2013) and analysis of the security behavior of users (keeping patches up to
date, cautious website visits, making regular backups, and using anti-virus programs)
are needed. Wash & Rader (2011) used mischief and vandal models for protection, and
crime and burglar models led to prevention
of access control.
Management of sharing private information appropriately is not an easy task and
how legal frameworks and OSN service
providers address privacy breaches or improper use of personal data should be studied. Then, based on the needs, different
types of tools can be implemented to detect and protect users’ privacy. After analyzing privacy preservation methods in the
literature, we categorize them into three
groups: wrapper-based methods, accesscontrol methods, and methods that increase
user awareness. Wrapper-based methods bac 2016 ADFSL
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Table 4. Overview of studies on forensics analysis and defense methods
Paper

Category

Sub-category

Sayaf et al. (2013)

privacy preservation

access control

I. Singh et al. (2012)

privacy preservation

wrapper-based

Baden et al. (2009)

privacy preservation

wrapper-based

K. Singh et al. (2009)

privacy preservation

wrapper-based

Yamada et al. (2012)

privacy preservation

access control

Hu et al. (2013)

privacy preservation

access control

Paradesi et al. (2012)

privacy preservation

access control

Burkholder & Greenstadt (2012)

privacy preservation

user awareness

White et al. (2013)

privacy preservation

user awareness

Y. Wang & Nepali (2013)

privacy preservation

user awareness

Z. Chu et al. (2010)

fake identity

user categorization

Viswanath et al. (2014)

fake identity

user categorization

Peled et al. (2013)

fake identity

profile matching

Vosecky et al. (2010)

fake identity

profile matching

Johansson et al. (2013)

fake identity

profile matching

Orebaugh & Allnutt (2010)

fake identity

authorship analysis

Orebaugh et al. (2014)

fake identity

authorship analysis

Orebaugh et al. (2014)

fake identity

gender detection

Douceur (2002)

fake identity

sybil

Yu et al. (2006)

fake identity

sybil

Yu et al. (2008)

fake identity

sybil

Cao et al. (2012)

fake identity

sybil

Wei et al. (2012)

fake identity

sybil

Alvisi et al. (2013)

fake identity

sybil

Heymann et al. (2007)

fake messaging

prevention, detection, demotion

Zubiaga & Ji (2014)

fake messaging

credibility of messages

Sikdar et al. (2013)

fake messaging

credibility of messages

Wagner et al. (2013)

fake messaging

user susceptibility

Yan et al. (2011)

fake messaging

reaction to infection

Yan et al. (2011)

fake messaging

network sanitation

Fire, Kagan, et al. (2014)

fake relationship

scoring friends

Mutawa et al. (2012)

data tracing

Facebook, Twitter, MySpace

Awan (2015)

data tracing

Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn

H. Chu et al. (2014)

data tracing

Facebook, Google Map

Cahyani et al. (2016)

data tracing

DropBox, Google Drive, OneDrive
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sically use an additional service and the user
utilizes this service while interacting with
the OSN. Access control methods determine
how and who should access the data of OSN
users. Methods that aim to increase user
awareness inform users how much information is available about themselves. Next, we
discuss these groups in detail.
4.1.1

Wrapper-based Methods

Most OSNs today provide some form of
privacy controls so that users can protect
their shared content from other users. However, these controls are typically not sufficiently expressive and/or do not provide finegrained protection of information. I. Singh
et al. (2012) introduce a new privacy controlgroup messaging on Twitter with users having fine-grained control over who can see
their messages. Specifically, they demonstrate that such a privacy control can be offered to users of Twitter without having to
wait for Twitter to make changes to its system. They have designed and implemented
Twitsper, a wrapper around Twitter that enables private group communication among
existing Twitter users while preserving Twitter’s commercial interests. Their design preserves the privacy of group information (i.e.,
who communicates with whom) both from
the Twitsper server as well as from undesired
Twitsper users. Furthermore, their evaluation shows that their implementation of
Twitsper imposes minimal server-side bandwidth requirements and incurs low clientside energy consumption.
Persona (Baden et al., 2009) enables users
to choose personal information to be stored
on a decentralized storage system and combines attribute-level encryption with public
key cryptography. Lockr (Tootoonchian et
al., 2009) (i) separates social networking content from the functionalities of the OSN, (ii)
avoids re-use of social data by the OSN for
unintended purposes by providing digitally
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signed social relationships to access social
data, and (iii) enables two strangers with a
common friend to confirm their relationship
using a message encryption based on a social relationship key without exposing themselves to others. FaceCloak (Luo et al., 2009)
is another method that hides private information, encrypts it, and stores on a separate server while using alternate fake information to the OSN while providing access to
only trusted or authorized users of a person.
NOYB (None Of Your Business) (Guha et
al., 2008) is a wrapper for OSNs to support
privacy of users by encrypting user data and
creating ciphertext similar to legitimate data
where only authorized users can decrypt and
decode the data.
There is no guarantee that these wrapperbased methods do not abuse the information
provided. To benefit the functionalities of
a third party application, a user may grant
access to her personal information regardless of the information is actually needed
or used for intended purposes. K. Singh
et al. (2009) developed xBook, a wrapper
around a third party application, that controls whether information is provided to external entities based on the policies or not.
However, it does not check whether information is actually needed by the application or
not.
4.1.2

Access Control Methods

The conflicts in OSNs may attract different
types of information leakage. Yamada et al.
(2012) show that friend-list recovery, profile recovery and post recovery attacks are
possible. Typical OSNs apply permit-takeprecedence meaning that grant authorizations have higher priority than denial rather
than denial-take-precedence where denial of
access has higher priority than grant access. Such attacks may be performed using
friends list or posting messages on the walls
of friends.
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Multiparty access model (Hu et al., 2013)
is proposed for preserving private data by
categorizing OSN users as owner, contributor, stakeholder, and disseminator. Whenever an access request is made, the policy
evaluation is performed with respect to the
policies of relevant parties and the final decision is based on by their decision, sensitivity
voting schemes or different types of conflict
resolution such as threshold-based, strategybased or for dissemination control.
It is also important to know how information about a person is revealed as an outcome of search results. Paradesi et al. (2012)
point out the problem of the privacy of social
networks and provide an interface, Policy
Aware Social Miner (PASM), which makes
it possible for the users to create policies
to guide the consumers how searches about
them should be executed. People may share
a content within a specific context which
is not harmful, but when it is viewed together with other shared content this may
picture the person in a different way or may
be harmful to this person. In their system,
a data consumer enters the user’s Facebook
username, keywords to search, and the purpose of the search such as employment, commercial, financial, and medical. Users can
keep their privacy restricting access, refutation, and filtering. Users may restrict access to their profiles by no-employment, nocommercial, and no-medical options. Refutation allows users to refuse the accuracy or
the ownership of information. Users may
also use filtering to hide posts having specific
words. While this interface can be effectively
used for Facebook, it can also be used for
Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, or other social
networks.
It is important to compare how technical
methods and legal frameworks work in case
of improper use of private information on
OSNs. Sayaf et al. (2013) address the privacy preservation of users in social software
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by comparing technical methods (e.g., services provided by OSNs) and legal frameworks (i.e., laws) is important . Access
control methods (ACMs) and accountability
methods are chosen as the technical methods. The Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ‘on
the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data’ is used to compare with the chosen technical methods. In
terms of privacy control, they analyze the
control of content, control of audience, linking to the user, and protection of data. Certain approaches of access control that aim
at enabling users to control who can access their data are reviewed. ACMs provide more control over the data on personal
exemption use than laws; however, ACMs
are difficult to use. Nevertheless, ACMs do
not restrict enough how OSN providers and
third-parties use the information. Accountability and audit approaches may identify
misconduct by analyzing the logged interactions of the user. The technical and legal frameworks are not necessarily consistent
and it is suggested that ethical framework
can be achieved after integrating both legal
and technical frameworks.
4.1.3

Methods for Increasing User
Awareness of Privacy

The main goal of increasing user awareness
is to inform how much information about the
user is revealed so that the user can take necessary precautions. For example, Heatherly
et al. (2013) show that private information
leakage can be reduced by removing some
details from the profiles and removing some
friendship links. Brown et al. (2008) suggest
that friends of users should also make their
profiles private. Using images instead of text
for sensitive attributes or blocking contextual information from non-friends are some
suggestions that could be implemented by
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OSN service providers. Measuring the privacy of a social network (Y. Wang & Nepali,
2013) or protecting privacy by concealing
users privacy (I. Singh et al., 2012; Sayaf
et al., 2013) may require tools to be implemented for protection of users’ privacy.
Moreover, Irani, Webb, et al. (2011) suggest
that account recovery services should indicate how strong account recovery questions
are.
Private information (e.g., address, relationships, visited locations) of many users
in online review sites are inadvertently disclosed with their reviews. Such private information about a person may be attacked from
their online reviews. If the attacker knows
the identity of a user, private information
disclosed in reviews can be combined with information from other sources. Burkholder &
Greenstadt (2012) aim to determine whether
such detailed private information is disclosed
or not. Types of unstructured and structured information made public by online review sites are characterized, and a privacy
check tool is developed. Three keyword categories were used for keyword matching to
detect privacy disclosure: relationship, location, and temporal. Relationship keywords
are used to catch potentially inadvertent disclosures of relationships or information tied
to relationships. Potentially inadvertent disclosures of the location of a user or user’s
home are identified by location keywords.
Temporal keywords are used to find potentially inadvertent disclosures such as location of a user at a given time or how often the
user goes to a specific place. Words in the
reviews are then compared with keywords in
the given keyword list. The Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) (Steven et al., 2009)
is used to scan each review for name recognition. Keyword matches and recognized
names are counted per review. The total
number of matches for a given keyword category and the total number of matches for inPage 94
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dividual keywords are computed. The number of named-entity matches, actual namedentity counts, and the percentage of keyword
matches by category are provided in their
analysis. In their experiments, they used
Amazon, Netflix, Yelp, OpenTable, and TripAdvisor as online review sites. For each
online review site, 10 items were selected for
review scrape and analysis. Items were selected based on popularity because it is assumed that more popular items would have
a greater number of lengthy reviews. Using
this tool, potentially sensitive review text is
annotated by keyword matching and namedentity recognition, and awareness of the privacy threat in online review sites is increased
through examples and statistics.
Rather than analyzing attacks on real social networks, a model of an online social network can be built and analyzed against attacks. White et al. (2013) developed a model
of an online social network and simulated an
attack towards this model. A game theoretic
approach is used for the attack to analyze
the actions an attacker and how much damage the attacker may cause to the system.
The simulation results help to figure out the
weakest points in the system. The authors
explain four different levels of information
sharing: optimal, under-shared, over-shared,
and hybrid states. Their game theoretic approach also helps users determine their optimum level of sharing.
Alternative way of identifying how much
information could be leaked is to develop
quantifiable measures for preserving privacy.
Y. Wang & Nepali (2013) proposed three privacy index measures based on three different
privacy measurement functions.
• Weighted Privacy Index (w-PIDX) measures an entity’s privacy based on
known attribute list weight.
• Maximum Privacy Index (m-PIDX)
measures an entity’s privacy based on
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the maximum attribute impact factor of
all the known attributes.
• Composite Privacy Index (c-PIDX)
measures an entity’s privacy based on
composite privacy measurement factors.
The efficacy of the PIDXes is evaluated in
various user groups by different testing scenarios. In an actor model, an actor is a social entity (e.g., people, organization, etc.)
in a social network. Actor has certain characteristics represented as attributes. Each
attribute has a different impact on privacy
called as Attribute Privacy Impact Factor
(APIF). In addition, each attribute is assigned a sensitivity value indicating the sensitivity of information revealed by that attribute. They use probability to describe
hidden information and virtual attributes as
a reflection of information visibility. Virtual
attribute describes a group of attributes behavior and their impact on privacy. A virtual attribute may have significant impact
on the privacy of an actor. Among all the
attributes in an actor model, if certain attributes are known, privacy might be disclosed. Privacy index is used to describe
an entity’s privacy exposure factor based on
the known attributes. It is computed using
privacy impact of known attributes. If it is
lower than given threshold T , privacy is considered to be preserved.
Preliminary attributes are extracted from
social networking sites’ personal profile and
privacy settings. 20 attributes including
name, SSN, birth date, education, etc. are
selected for testing, and a privacy impact
factor is assigned to each attribute. The
three PIDXes are evaluated when known attributes change incrementally for different
user groups. While w-PIDX is not good
for privacy ranking, m-PIDX is not good at
measuring privacy increment change. Tests
and analysis show that composite privacy inc 2016 ADFSL
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dex measures best the privacy for social network actor model.
User privacy has become an important
concern in online social networks (OSNs).
The users should be notified of inadvertent
privacy disclosures by both client-side and
server privacy check tools. However, finding the best privacy preservation technique
is not a simple task.

4.2

Handling Fake Identities

Since true identities of users at social network sites may not be known, it is important
to protect users by identifying real and fake
user accounts. For example, friendship requests may not always come from a real person. There are different types of users such
as fake users, bots that generate automatic
messages, and cyborgs (human-assisted bots
or bot-assisted humans) (Z. Chu et al.,
2010) and spammers (M. Singh et al., 2016;
A. H. Wang, 2010). Criminals such as stalkers, sex offenders, etc. may also take the advantage of OSNs and hide their true identities. Therefore detecting these types of users
is important for taking secure actions and as
well as performing forensics investigations.
Strong Captchas are recommended to
avoid automated identity cloning attacks
(Bilge et al., 2009). When new accounts are
created OSNs may require valid IDs. In case
the system is able to identify candidate fake
identities, those users could be requested
to answer questions from his or her friends
properly (Schechter et al., 2009). Forging
identity attacks could be minimized if a person’s identity is determined with respect to
his/her contacts or whom he/she communicates in the network (Zhang et al., 2010).
Alternative methods may include analyzing
activities of fake identities or their response
to the validation process (Jin et al., 2011).
It is important for forensics investigators
to identify fake profiles. The first step of
fake identity detection is separating human
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users from bots and cyborgs. Once human
users are detected, their true identity may
be revealed using multiple online social networks and analyzing contents of messages for
authorship. In this section we discuss the
studies focusing on categorization of users on
OSNs, profile matching by comparing multiple networks, and identifying the true authors of online postings. We briefly look into
detection of profile deception. Since some attacks such as de-anonymization attacks are
launched by sybil nodes, it is critical for systems to limit the number of fake identities
that could be created to thwart such attacks.
4.2.1

Categorizing Users

The users may be exposed to different types
of interactions on online social networks. In
Twitter, there are some tweets posted by automated programs known as bots. In addition, cyborgs have recently emerged on
OSNs. In order to assist human users in
identifying whom they are interacting with,
Z. Chu et al. (2010) focus on the classification of human, bot, and cyborg accounts
on Twitter. The authors analyze a collection of over 500K accounts to see the differences among human, bot, and cyborg in
terms of tweeting behavior, tweet content,
and account properties. According to their
analysis, a classification system is proposed
which includes the following four parts: (i)
an entropy-based component, (ii) a machinelearning-based component, (iii) an account
properties component, and (iv) a decision
maker. The entropy-based component calculates the entropy (and corrected conditional
entropy) of inter-tweet delays of a Twitter
user. A lower entropy indicates periodic or
regular timing of tweeting behavior, a sign
of automation, whereas a higher entropy implies irregular behavior, a sign of human participation. The machine learning component
is used to determine whether the tweet content is a spam or not based on the learned
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text patterns. The account properties component checks properties such as URL ratio,
tweeting device makeup, etc. and generates
a real-number value for each property. These
three components create a set of features
that are used to train a classifier. A classification score is assigned to each class and the
class having the highest score is used as the
indicator of a bot, cyborg, or human. In the
experiments, 1K cyborgs, 1K humans, and
1K bots are used for validation. The sensitivity values are obtained as 82.80%, 93.70%,
and 94.90% for cyborg, bot, and human categories respectively. The authors also conclude that bots are not misclassified as humans by their system and vice versa.
Behavior-based anomaly detection techniques can also be used for detecting fake
identities (Bilge et al., 2009). Viswanath et
al. (2014) apply principal component analysis on temporal, spatial, spatiotemporal and
combination of these features for detecting
anomalous behavior and use it for detecting fake, compromised, and colluding identities without using a priori labeling while
achieving low false-positive rates. They have
achieved 66% accuracy of detecting anomalous behavior regarding fake, compromised
and colluding identities with 0.35 false positives corresponding to 94% of misbehavior.
4.2.2

Matching Profiles across
Multiple Networks

Nowadays, people have a separate account
for each different social network. So, entity
resolution for online social networks is important to match profiles of the same person across multiple OSNs using available information in their profiles and networks. In
other words, two different user profiles from
two different OSNs can be matched based
on the features extracted from user profile
and networks. There are some studies about
profile matching and while some of them just
use profiles of users (Peled et al., 2013), some
c 2016 ADFSL
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of them use friend networks.
Peled et al. (2013) provide a four-step algorithm for entity resolution based on user
profiles: data acquisition, feature extraction,
training set construction, and building the
model. In the data acquisition stage, irrelevant data are filtered out after crawling user profiles. Feature extraction stage
extracts features for comparing two profiles from two different OSNs. Three different types of features are created: name
based, general user information based, and
social network topological features. Namebased features target name similarity and
use the following list of name similarity measures: Soundex, difference, longest common
sub-string (LCS), compression, Damareau
Levenshthein, Jaro Winkler, n-gram, VMN
(Vosecky et al., 2009). General user information based features are compared using
locations distance, current employer similarity (n-gram, Damareau Levenshthein, Jaro
Winkler), Jaccard, semi vector space model
similarity, and vector space model of full
profile similarity. Social network topological features include the number of mutual
(common) friends and the number of mutual friends of friends. When building the
training set in the third stage, users who are
members of both networks are identified according to their names by performing a cross
reference check between the collected users’
profiles. Next, each matched pair of profiles
is checked manually using the profile photos
to see whether they belong to the same real
person. A label (match or a non-match) is
given to each checked pair. The remaining
users whose names did not match are used to
create negative pairs. Then a model is constructed by using the training dataset in the
last stage. In the experiment stage, 16,561
user profiles from Facebook and 15,430 from
Xing are used. Among the collected profiles,
464 pairs of users are detected as the same
user (with the same first and last names)
c 2016 ADFSL
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in Xing and Facebook. AdaBoost, Rotation Forest, Random Forest, Logistics Model
Tree (LMT), LogitBoost and Artificial Neural Networks are used to build the classifier
model. According to the performed experiments in this work, it is observed that even
though the name based features are the most
important ones, the best results are obtained
when 27 features are combined. The best
score was obtained using LogitBoost with
0.98 AUC (area-under-the-curve).
To extend the profile matching method,
a structural approach is proposed to identify a user based on their friend network in
(Vosecky et al., 2010). When some part of a
user profile is missing or unavailable, friend
network can be useful for profile matching.
The total number of mutual friends is determined between two users’ friend lists on two
different domains. The friends’ names are
matched and a similarity score is computed
using a match name function. All similarity scores above 0.75 are added to obtain a
total friends overlap score. Structural approach is combined with profile matching approach. To evaluate their methods, they use
a dataset crawled from Facebook and StudiVZ. A multi-layer perceptron (MLP), a logistic regression method (LogitBoost) and
an Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) are applied for classification and their performance
is compared. AdaBoost yields particularly
the highest accuracy (93%) in their experiments.
While many people have accounts on multiple online social networks, some people also
use several accounts on a single social media
site with different user names. It is important to detect users who use multiple aliases
for catching terrorists and extremists as they
may lead people to commit crimes (see the
case of owner of many personae Joshua Goldberg (Justice.gov, 2017)). Johansson et al.
(2013) present four different matching techniques to identify users with multiple aliases.
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These are (i) string-based, (ii) stylometricbased, (iii) time profile-based, and (iv) social
network based matching techniques. Stringbased matching is based on alias names using Jaro-Winkler edit distance. Time-profile
based matching is based on the publishing
time of the posts. The time of day is discretized into equal-sized intervals. A feature
vector that represents the number of posts
per hour is created. Euclidean distance is
used to measure the difference of two vectors. Stylometric matching is based on the
statistical analysis of writing style such as
the length of words and sentences, the number of letters, digits, punctuation and function words. Cosine similarity is used to measure similarity between these feature vectors.
Their social network based matching is based
on thread or friend information. They try to
see how two aliases have similar networks using Jaccard similarity of neighbors, which is
the ratio of the number of common neighbors
to the number of union of neighbors. For
experimental analysis, they used data composed of 9 million documents from Irish website forum (https://www.boards.ie). The
aliases who have more than 60 posts are investigated. For analysis, basically two versions of each user are built where one version has the odd numbered posts and the
other version has the even numbered posts.
If the selected alias appears within top-N
rankings (N = 1 or N = 3), alias matching is considered as success. The experiment
results show that time profile-based matching has higher accuracy than stylometricbased matching. The combination of both
matching techniques (time profile and stylometric) gives significantly better accuracy
results than applying them individually. The
accuracies for 50, 250, and 1K users were
70%, 55%, and 43%, respectively. The accuracy increased to 80%, 70%, and 56% for 50,
250, and 1K users, respectively, when top-3
aliases were considered for success.

4.2.3
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Authorship Analysis

Messages posted on social media give important information about their authors. Each
person has distinguishing stylometric features as his or her writeprints. Authorship
analysis of messages may be performed for
cyberforensics investigations. A variety of
computer-aided statistical methods are used
to analyze text to determine the most plausible author of a piece of text in authorship
identification. Orebaugh & Allnutt (2010)
present an Instant Messaging (IM) authorship analysis framework to determine the
identity of an author. The proposed framework is composed of data pre-processing, feature extraction, and classification stages. In
the data pre-processing stage, the messages
are parsed and irrelevant data such as metadata and noise are filtered out. The logs are
split into conversations based on the number
of messages per conversation. Conversations
are fed to the feature extraction module. Instant Messaging feature set consists of 356
features composed of 200 lexical, 154 syntactic, and 2 structural features. The lexical features consist of 20 character-based, 3
word-based, 59 abbreviation frequency, and
42 emoticons frequency features. The syntactic features are composed of 146 function
word frequency and 8 punctuation frequency
features. The structural features consist of
the average number of words and characters
per message. For classification, C4.5 decision tree, Naive Bayes, SVM, and k-nearest
neighborhood classifiers are evaluated. SVM
provided better and consistent results as the
number of authors increased from 2 to 19.
The best accuracy was 84.4% when all features are used with SVM for 25 authors with
50 messages per conversation.
Behavioral biometrics are acquired over
time and can be used to recognize or verify the identity of a person. Orebaugh et al.
(2014) use behavioral biometrics-based inc 2016 ADFSL
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stant messaging writeprints as cyberforensics input. Author writeprints are created
with stylometric features extracted from IM
messages and statistical methods are used to
analyze and evaluate the writeprints. Similar to the study by Orebaugh & Allnutt
(2010), their framework includes developing a stylometric feature set, pre-processing
the data, creating writeprints and creating
PCA (principal components analysis) visualizations of writeprints. They use a 356dimensional vector as the feature set including lexical, syntactic, and structural features. Conversations are created as a set
of messages {M1 , . . . , Mp } by splitting logs
in the writeprint extractor module. These
conversations are used to define stylometric features.
For each set of messages
{M1 , . . . , Mp } of each supplied author (An ),
a writeprint (Wx ) is given as the output. A
writeprint is a t-dimensional vector, where
t represents the total number of features.
PCA models are used for dimension reduction on the writeprints after normalization
and standardization. Gnuplot is used for
visualization. In their experiments, personal IM conversation logs with and without author information are used for evaluation. Their plots with different settings for
datasets with author information show separate groupings for each author. Plots for unknown author show some separation among
the authors.
4.2.4

Detecting Deception

Deception became particularly critical topic
when examining social media services where
interactions between victims and deceivers
are not fully controlled. Alowibdi et al.
(2014) analyze gender deception for Twitter since Twitter profiles do not have gender attribute. They calculate a gender score
and male trending factor on twitter data by
using username, first name, and 5 profile
colors as feature vectors with hybrid clasc 2016 ADFSL

JDFSL V11N4
sifiers based on Naive Bayes and Decision
trees. The color features are composed of
background color, text color, link color, sidebar fill color, and sidebar border color. If a
user provides Facebook profile link, the gender of that user is extracted from the Facebook profile. The genders extracted from
Facebook profiles are used as ground-truth
in order to build the model for gender prediction. Out of 192K profile data collected, to
balance male-female distribution, randomly
87.3K male and 87.3K female accounts were
selected and then investigated. Gender prediction was performed based on first names
(f), usernames (u), and color features (c).
Gender prediction accuracies by first name,
username, colors and all-combined are 82%,
70%, 75%, and 85%, respectively. Male
trending factor is calculated for each user:
m = (wf ∗sf +wu ∗su +wc ∗sc )/(wf +wu +wc )
where wf , wu , and wc are weights of the three
gender indicators (first names, usernames,
and the 5 color characteristics combined). w
weight values represent the difference of accuracy from baseline, wf = 82% − 50% =
32%. A sensitivity value for each factor (sf ,
su , and sc ) is calculated with respect to the
proportion of female vs. male having that
feature. For instance, the name “Mary” has
a high sensitivity value close to 1.0 for females. Collected male trending values are divided into 5 categories by standard deviation
and variance as in Table 5. Weak female and
weak male groups are considered as deceptive groups. After manually checking 5% of
the data, 24 out of 133 weak male and 11 out
of 188 weak female users were determined to
be quite deceptive. In addition to gender detection, identifying other attributes such as
age, geo-location, and profession has been
covered in Tuna et al. (2016).

Page 99

JDFSL V11N4

A Survey of Social Network Forensics

Table 5. Five groups depending on the male
index
Strong female
Weak female
Weak male
Strong male
Neutral
4.2.5

0 ≤ m ≤ µ − 2σ
µ − 2σ ≤ m ≤ µ − σ
µ + σ ≤ m ≤ µ + 2σ
µ + 2σ ≤ m ≤ 1
otherwise

Defense Methods for
De-anonymization

Trusted certification, resource testing and
recurring costs are some methods to deal
with de-anonymization and sybil attacks.
In trusted certification, where only certified users can join the network, may completely eliminate the sybil attack (Douceur,
2002). Resource testing analyzes network
structure, network bandwidth, computational and storage resources, and the number
of IP addresses associated for nodes corresponding to real users. Recurring validation
such as Captchas while creating new nodes
may minimize the creation of sybil nodes
(Gao et al., 2011).
SybilGuard (Yu et al., 2006), SybilLimit
(Yu et al., 2008), SybilRank (Cao et al.,
2012) and SybilDefender (Wei et al., 2012)
are some methods to thwart sybil attacks.
SybilGuard uses “quotient cuts” (i.e., removing small number of attack edges would
lead removing large number of nodes from
the graphs) between trustable nodes and
sybil nodes by removing a small set of edges
(Yu et al., 2006). While SybilGuard limits√the number of sybil nodes, it may accept
O( nlogn) nodes which could be large if the
network is large. Moreover, it assumes that
the social network is fast mixing without validation. SybilLimit method shows that actual social networks are mixing within 10 to
20 nodes despite having social communities.
SybilLimit reduces the√number of accepted
nodes by a factor of Θ( n). SybilGuard first
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identifies a sybil node and then applies sybil
community detection algorithm to identify
the sybil community. The number of attack edges could be limited by allowing users
to rate their relationships or using an activity network graph that indicates interactions
among users rather than only relationships.
SybilRank detects sybil nodes in 3 stages:
(i) propagating trust via O(logn) power iterations, (ii) ranking nodes based on degreenormalized trust, and (iii) annotating some
of the fake nodes. Their main contribution is
to be able to rank nodes where lower values
indicate the likelihood of being a sybil node.
Alvisi et al. (2013) list four commonly used
properties of structural graphs: popularity
(degree of a node), small distance property
(the maximum distance between any nodes
in a social graph), clustering coefficient (related to the number of friendships of a user
to the number of friendships among friends),
and conductance (the ratio of the number of
outgoing edges from the graph to the number of edges in the graph). The conductance
property makes harder than other properties
to act as undetected while not being fully
fool-proof.
Do these de-anonymization defense methods make OSNs safe? In some scenarios,
researchers develop de-anonymization techniques and then develop possible defense
strategies against those types of techniques.
Alvisi et al. (2013) point out the Maginot
syndrome for OSNs. In other words, while
building strong defenses against sybil attacks, sophisticated attacks can be designed
that exploit the weaknesses of these defenses.
OSNs might be more susceptible for sophisticated attacks or undetected attacks than
considered.

4.3

Handling Fake Messages

Content-based
analysis
of
messages
and postings is needed to detect illegal/inappropriate postings and fake
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messages and to avoid deception. Since
OSNs also allow posting images, videos, and
audio, OSN service providers should detect
harmful messages and postings and remove
or block them in real time. Accounts could
be hacked (Zangerle & Specht, 2014) and
OSN service providers should detect account
hacks by analyzing messages. Moreover,
users might be infected by malware and
methods are needed to limit the propagation
of malware and spam as well as harmful
messages. The spread of malicious messages
should be prevented if possible. Otherwise,
they should be detected, and doubtful
messages should be demoted by the system.
OSN service providers may also analyze the
credibility of messages. Lastly, we briefly
overview how the resilience of OSNs could
be improved to avoid the harmful results of
malicious messages.
4.3.1

Prevention, Detection and
Demotion

The countermeasures for spams are grouped
as detection, demotion, and prevention by
(Heymann et al., 2007). These countermeasures could be generalized to all types of
messages. Detection-based methods try to
identify spams and remove them by methods such as text classification, user behavior analysis, link analysis, manual user identification, and manual moderator identification. Brown et al. (2008) and W. Xu et al.
(2010) suggest that OSN service providers
may setup fake accounts or “decoy friends”
to detect context-aware spam, worms and
propagation of possible worms. OSN service providers may limit the number of memberships of accounts to restrict possible fake
accounts. Demotion-based methods try to
lower the rank of spams. Prevention-based
methods add barriers for spams by changing
interfaces or limiting user actions by incorporating Captchas, account fees, proof of work,
pay per action, community size limits, and
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hidden or partitioned input interfaces. Digitally signed messages or browser alerts may
be helpful to thwart phishing attacks (Chou
et al., 2004).
4.3.2

Analyzing Credibility of
Messages

Determining the truth of messages is a challenging task. False messages can easily be
spread through OSNs and may result in financial loss or fatal outcomes. OSN service
providers should develop effective methods
to analyze the credibility of messages.
In the literature, there are some research
studies that aim to detect footprints of fake
messages and posts. Zubiaga & Ji (2014)
study the credibility of information shared
on social networks, particularly after natural
calamities such as Hurricane Sandy stroke
the US. In such serious moments, it is important to have reliable and trustworthy information shared on the Internet. In this study,
Zubiaga & Ji (2014) analyze the accuracy of
credibility perceptions on different features
of witness pictures posted on Twitter during Hurricane Sandy’s impact and aftermath
in the East Coast of the United States in
October 2012. They analyze credibility ratings provided by Amazon Mechanical Turk2
(AMT) workers on different features of the
tweets with those pictures. They evaluate
their assessments by identifying real and fake
pictures from those features, and then compare with the results obtained by experts.
They determine factors and features for assessing credibility. They identify (i) features
that can improve accuracy of credibility perceptions such as author details currently not
readily available on Twitter’s feeds, (ii) features that may harm accuracy, such as writing and spelling in tweets, and (iii) other factors that influence users’ perceptions (e.g.,
repeated exposure of the same hoax received
from different authors leads users to mistakenly getting convinced about its veracity).
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A total of 32 pictures were analyzed for the
Hurricane Sandy. For each picture, 6 ratings
were obtained: authority, text plausibility,
picture plausibility, corroboration, presentation, and the whole tweet. Since the authors
were already given final assessments for each
picture by professionals, they were interested
in analyzing not only how features were related to each other, but also in studying the
accuracy of AMT workers when rating each
feature (i.e., verifying tweets). The results
show that the whole tweet helped to correctly distinguish real tweets from fake ones
in terms of recall.
Another way to check credibility is to analyze messages during and after an event.
Sikdar et al. (2013) provide a method on
how to construct reliable ground truth values or identify credibility for the microblogging sites such as Twitter. They collected
two different datasets from Twitter using
the Streaming API (Twitter, 2017) for messages on Hurricane Sandy during and after
the hurricane. The first dataset consists of a
large group of people and many of them may
not know each other. Also, since this dataset
was collected while the hurricane was developing, there exists some uncertainty about
the hurricane in the first dataset. On the
other hand, the users of the second dataset
were more connected, and they were more
knowledgeable about the event. The second dataset was collected by using the keyword “#occupysandy,” which is a relief effort
to distribute resources. Therefore, the second dataset is more credible than the first
dataset. In order to perform the analysis
they collected samples of tweets from each
dataset. They conducted two surveys using
MTurk users to evaluate the credibility of
messages with 6 levels of credibility opinion
(can’t-answer, strongly non-credible, moderately non-credible, neutral, moderately credible, and strongly credible). The first survey
includes messages, source image, and numPage 102
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ber of retweets. The second survey includes
messages only.
In these surveys, they also ask users to
annotate the tweets regarding the credibility of the message newsworthiness, and the
credibility of the user. For the ground truth
selection, they look at the correlation between credibility judgments in both surveys.
They find that there is no correlation between credibility of messages in both surveys. However, the credible newsworthy
messages of the first and second surveys are
highly correlated. They also find out credibility of messages, credibility of users, and
newsworthiness of tweets are highly correlated in the first survey.
Psychologists have shown that human behavior deviate from its normal behavior
when a person lies. Bhaskaran et al. (2011)
focus on the eye movements to detect the
deceits. In their experiments, 132 human
subjects were interviewed using two types of
questions: (i) questions involving basic conversations and (ii) critical questions which
involve reward or punishment. These interviews were video recorded. The subjects also
filled out questionnaires to indicate if they
lied or not. In order to collect the data for
their experiments, the eye pupil regions were
detected using image processing techniques
to learn the behavioral features. The authors used Bayesian model of eye movements
in the basic conversation period to learn the
normal behavior of a person. The rest of
the interview was divided into time slots and
each slot was evaluated using the trained
model by computing its log-likelihood. Deviations from normal behavior were tested using the log likelihoods of each time slot. Deceit and non-deceit videos showed very distinctive patterns. In the testing part of the
process on the 40 subjects, they had 82.5%
accuracy in deceit detection.
Understanding the dynamics of deception
and deceptive behaviors in online social netc 2016 ADFSL
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works is both crucial and significantly challenging. It requires new tools, softwares, and
new perspectives in applied analyses to improve the findings. The expansion in the online social media world continues with the
help of diverse set of tools which aim to
ease their usage for the end users. Hence,
aforementioned methods, tools and models
are particularly important for law enforcement and forensics investigators to detect
certain activities (e.g., deception, fake messages, spam) which may eventually evolve to
criminal ones.
4.3.3

Improving Resilience to
Infection

To avoid infection of user systems by malicious malware or messages, it is important
to check the susceptibility of users to such
infection. If user systems are infected, the
infected users may inform neighbors as soon
as possible or the OSN provider may develop the network in a way that malicious
messages are quarantined before being propagated to other parts of the network.
Susceptibility of Users to Infection.
It may be possible to determine the susceptibility of users for social bot attacks
and whether users are infected or not (Wagner et al., 2012). Wagner et al. (2012)
extract a wide set of linguistic, network
(hub and authority score, in- and out-degree,
clustering coefficient) and behavioral (conversational variety, conversational balance,
conversational coverage, lexical variety, lexical balance, topical variety, topical balance, informational variety, informational
balance, informational coverage, temporal
variety, temporal balance, temporal coverage) features to determine the susceptibility
of users. They found out that susceptible
users tend to use OSN for a conversational
purpose and communicate with many different users using more social words and show
more affection than non-susceptible users on
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Twitter. This shows that the active users
of OSNs are vulnerable to social bot attacks
than passive users.
Reaction to Infection. The attacker
may consider the number of neighbors as well
as the number of neighbors to be active after
being infected for effective malware propagation (Yan et al., 2011). User-oriented defense
methods are categorized as active and reactive (Yan et al., 2011). In active defense,
when a machine recovers from infection, it
informs neighbors and the neighbor getting
this message becomes immune when it becomes active. If a neighbor transmits this
message to its other neighbors then it is considered an active defense otherwise it is reactive defense. Detecting malware as quickly
as possible is critical; however, active defense
is still effective even with low detection rate.
Network Sanitation.
OSN service
providers may analyze URLs in messages
from or to sanitized nodes selected based
on the degree of a node, active nodes, or
activities and make sure that the messages
from/to these nodes are malware free (Yan
et al., 2011). In another approach, Yan et
al. (2011) propose preventive containment
where the graph is partitioned into islands
and it is guaranteed that malware does not
propagate from one island to another island.

4.4

Handling Fake
Relationships

OSNs introduce different types of relationships, trust strength and interaction intensity (Zhang et al., 2010). The relationships
could be bi-directional as friendship relationships or one-directional as in follower or fan
relationships. Trust strength indicates how
much a user trusts another user on a general or specific topic. Interaction intensity
involves both quantity and quality of interactions between users. Social link forging
(fake relationship) attacks can be avoided or
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minimized by the trust strength and interaction intensity of relationships, and moreover,
since OSN users may also meet face-to-face,
the true identities of (malicious) users are
likely to be revealed. The trust path between
users can help to determine the position of a
node.
OSN service providers should help to find
trustable friends. Dong et al. (2011) provide
a method of finding secure friends by letting
users utilize virtual IDs and digital signatures for authentication, applying proximity
prefiltering by eliminating profiles that are
less likely to be friends and enhancing this
scheme with homomorphic cryptography to
validate social coordinates and proximity results.
Fake relationships can be minimized by increasing user awareness. Bilge et al. (2009)
suggest that users should be more alert when
accepting friendships. On the other hand,
OSN service providers may look at the relationships between users before suggesting friendships beyond basic email look-up
(Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011). Similar to detecting spam messages, a honeypot account
can be set up to detect requests from other
users (Irani, Balduzzi, et al., 2011). Irani,
Balduzzi, et al. (2011) suggest that the usage
of Captcha for incoming friendship requests
could be an additional barrier for reverse social engineering attacks.
OSN service providers should enhance
OSNs by providing tools that help users accept or reject some friendship or relationships requests. Such tools will improve user’s
security and privacy. A Social Privacy Protector (SPP) software (Fire, Kagan, et al.,
2014), which is developed for Facebook, includes three protection layers to enhance the
user privacy. In the first layer, the software
identifies a friend of a user who might pose
a threat. Then this friend’s exposure is restricted to the user’s personal information.
A credibility score is assigned to each friend
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in their friend list according to the strength
of the connection between the user and
his/her friends. The strength of each connection is computed based on different features such as the number of common friends
and the number of pictures tagged in together. A simple heuristics or a more sophisticated machine learning algorithm is used to
compute the credibility score. Friends with
lower scores have the higher likelihood of being fake profiles. In the second layer, Facebook’s basic privacy settings are expanded
based on different types of social network usage profiles. The user’s internet activity and
the number of applications installed on the
user’s Facebook profile are observed. The
number of installed applications that have
access to user’s private information is provided as a warning to the user. The last layer
includes the HTTP Server to analyze, store,
and cache software results for each user. The
HTTP server is a part of the SPP responsible for connecting the SPP Firefox Add-on to
the SPP Facebook application. Also, some
statistics are provided about Facebook user
privacy settings, which were obtained by the
SPP Add-on. These statistics demonstrate
how Facebook users’ personal information
is exposed to fake profile attacks and third
party applications. Experiment data is collected on each SPP’s user and his/her links.
The links of the user include different types
of Facebook friends: (i) friends who are recommended with restrictions by the application due to a low connection-strength score,
(ii) friends who were restricted by the user,
(iii) friends who were not restricted by the
user, (iv) friends who were not recommended
with restrictions by the application, and (v)
friends who were deliberately chosen to be
restricted. Then, the collected data is used
to learn more about Facebook user’s privacy
settings, and classifiers are built using collected data to identify Facebook profiles with
higher likelihoods of being fake.
c 2016 ADFSL
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4.5

Data Tracing for Forensics

In many criminal cases, searching forensics
artifacts in the traces of social networks data
is essential for the success of an investigation. Hence, it is studied in a variety of contexts: collecting and creating new data representations from different data sources by
crawling different websites (Huber, Mulazzani, Leithner, et al., 2011) or tracking the
logs in system files (Turnbull & Randhawa,
2015). Due to the common usage of mobile
devices for social network access, mobile devices have also been studied for recovering
traces of data for various activities (Mutawa
et al., 2012; H. Chu et al., 2014; Awan, 2015;
Norouzizadeh Dezfouli et al., 2016; Cahyani
et al., 2016).
4.5.1

Searching Traces of Data

Many online social networks provide APIs
for data collection. However, these available APIs and other tools that are used for
crawling data from online social networks
cannot guarantee the granularity and efficiency of the data for proper analysis. Social Snapshots (Huber, Mulazzani, Leithner,
et al., 2011) is developed to collect social network data with the aim of harvesting more
data compared to the other available tools
such that it can be utilized more effectively
for searching and analyzing online evidence.
It is designed as a hybrid system of a web
browser and an online social network mediator application having six modules: social
snapshot client, automated web browser, social network mediator, hijacking, digital image forensics, and analysis. Social snapshot
client module is responsible to trigger the
process by using user credentials. Automated
web browser module takes care of simple
communication with the social network. Social network mediator application is responsible of harvesting data over the targeted
online social networks API. Hijacking modc 2016 ADFSL
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ule is a basic network sniffer package that
collects legitimate HTTP cookies of an online social network. Digital image forensics
module is responsible to match images gathered from online social networks with their
original source. Finally, analysis module is
a parsing module that separates and cleans
the collected data. Social Snapshots is evaluated with the participation of 25 human volunteers. Facebook data has been collected
through the mediator application via using
the Graph API. The mediator application
collected 9,800 Facebook account elements
per test subject on average. 238 profiles have
been crawled and on average, 22 phone numbers, 65 instant messaging accounts, and 162
email addresses were collected. The datasets
of Social Snapshots consist of profile information such as user data, private messages,
photos, etc. as well as the associated metadata such as internal timestamps and unique
identifiers which are quite significant for digital forensics investigation and security research.
As mentioned earlier, accessing social networks via mobile devices is very common,
thus tracing data in mobile devices may provide help to track activities of people for
forensics analysis. Mutawa et al. (2012)
focus on conducting forensic analyses on
three widely used social networking applications: Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace.
The tests were conducted on three popular smartphones: BlackBerrys, iPhones, and
Android phones. In a very similar study,
Awan (2015) conducted forensic analyses
on Facebook, Twitter and Linkedn by using four type of smarthpones: BlackBerry,
iPhone, Android and Windows phone. In
both studies, the goal is to find the artifacts
of social network applications on these devices for forensic analyses. The tests consisted of installing the social networking applications on each device, conducting common user activities (e.g., uploading photos,
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Table 6. Social Network and mobile application data extraction for mobile forensic analyses
H. Chu et
al. (2014)

Cahyani et al.
(2016)

IOS(IPhone), Android
(Samsung), Blackberry

IOS(IPhone),
Android
(Samsung),
Windows
(Nokia),
Blackberry

PDA

Android
(Samsung),
Windows (Nokia)

Facebook. Twitter, MySpace

Facebook,
Twitter, LinkedIn

Facebook,
Google
Map

Dropbox, Google
Drive, OneDrive

Mutawa et al. (2012)

Awan (2015)

Device /
Operating
System
Application

IOS - Facebook (user and
contact details, profile
picture URLs, photo uploads,
posted comments, friends
with active chat sessions),
Android - Facebook (user
and contact details,profile
picture URLs, photo uploads,
created albums, pictures
viewed with app,
mailbox/chat messages),

Information
collected

IOS - Twitter (for user and
people followed: user names,
profile picture URLs, tweets
posted with time stamps)
Android - Twitter (for user
and people followed: user
names, profile picture URLs,
posted tweets and photos,
other activity information
such as which device is used
to tweet),
IOS - MySpace (User
name/password, posted
comments with timestamps)
Android - MySpace (user
name/password, cookies &
cache files)

Comment
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No data could be gathered
from BlackBerry Devices

IOS&Android Facebook
(Profile name,
contact details,
images)
Windows Facebook (chat,
videos, images)
IOS&Android Twitter (profile
name, followers,
tweets)
Windows Twitter (tweets)
IOS&Android LinkedIn
(profile name,
contact details)
Windows LinkedIn
(Contact details)

No data could be
gathered from
BlackBerry
Devices

Android Dropbox
(documents,
sounds, images,
videos)

Facebook
(email)

Google
Maps
(geolocation)

Android Google Drive
(documents,
sounds, images,
videos)
Android OneDrive
(sounds, images,
videos)
Windows Dropbox&
OneDrive
(images)
Windows Google Drive
(NA)

In windows
device, only
image files were
successfully
uploaded
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posting comments, and sending emails) using each application, acquiring a forensically
sound logical image of each device, and then
performing manual forensic analysis on each
acquired logical image. The forensic analyses were aimed at determining whether activities conducted through these applications
were stored on the device’s internal memory. If so, the extent, significance, and location of the data that could be found and retrieved from the logical image of each device
were determined. The results show that no
traces could be recovered from BlackBerry
devices. However, iPhone, Android and
Windows phones store a significant amount
of valuable data that could be recovered and
used by forensic investigators.
Cloud storage apps and and common usage of these apps in mobile devices make
researchers to perform forensic analyses on
these devices. Cahyani et al. (2016) studied the role of mobile forensics in terrorism investigations involving the use of cloud
apps: Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft
OneDrive. These cloud storage apps may be
used to store incriminating evidence while
communication apps may be used to exchange voice and video messages. By using forensic techniques, one could potentially
recover information such as chat logs, multimedia files, contact lists, and geo-tagged
data, which can then be used to determine
the chain of events, and identify their associates. A dataset comprises 37 files made up
of document, audio, picture, video and executable files uploaded through these apps in
two devices with different operating systems:
android and windows phone. These files
and their artifacts on these devices were collected using a combination of physical, logical and manual acquisition methods. As Table 6 shows, most of the data were downloadable by client apps. In additon to that, all
sender-receiver account artifacts were gathered by accessing the related local SQLite
c 2016 ADFSL
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database files in these mobile devices. Usernames, passwords, and the list of shared
files shared could be extracted. Finally,
H. Chu et al. (2014) worked in different environments and extracted geo-location info
recorded by Google Maps and Facebook application from a personal digital assistant
(PDA) device. Data are gathered from the
image of the memory while the device is on.
In the traditional digital forensics investigations, examiner almost always analyzes
the log files collected from computer and network systems. In addition to the analysis of
user created data in mobile devices discussed
above, analysis of log files produced by mobile devices is also significantly important
for social network investigations. If a log
of operations by a user is maintained properly, this log could be analyzed for suspicious
data access. Turnbull & Randhawa (2015)
implemented a tool, ParFor (Parallax Forensics), which provides a unified representation
of different data sources to support a higher
level reasoning. The hierarchy of files, directories and file systems, user accounts and
system information, system events, and user
events are examined to create an automated
rule based extraction system. For example,
if the login and logout time slots are kept
for a user, then the files which seem to be
changed by this user out of this time slots
can be reported as a suspicious activity.
4.5.2

Discussion

Successful information collection is one aspect of searching traces of data. However,
there are cases when too much insignificant
or unnecessary information could be collected from mobile devices. Huber, Mulazzani, Leithner, et al. (2011) propose to create a timeline of the metadata they gathered
from Social Snapshot tool so that they can
be used in forensic analyses ( e.g., userA uploaded an image, userB commented, userA
responded and shared a video, etc.). This
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would notably help if the goal is to track time
based events. However, generic queries without a time frame would require too much effort to analyze the metadata especially for
actively used social network profiles. There
is a need to filter out some of the information
from the metadata which will not really effect the analyses, but will speed up the manual examination.
Despite significant studies collecting social
network information from mobile devices,
the upgrades and updates made by OSN
service providers and operating systems of
mobile devices make reusability of previous
work challenging. Huber, Mulazzani, Leithner, et al. (2011) could get phone numbers and contact details for Facebook profiles by using Facebook graph API and other
crawling websites. Mutawa et al. (2012) and
Awan (2015) were able to get different social network usernames/passwords, contact
lists, and some related activities with their
timestamps from the internal memory of a
smartphone. H. Chu et al. (2014) managed to track the user geolocation coordinates with timestamps related to a facebook
account from a PDA device. Cahyani et
al. (2016) spotted the files and extracted
sender-receiver information from cloud apps
in mobile devices. Turnbull & Randhawa
(2015) were able to get only MSN messenger
contact lists from the user directories located
in hard disks. These studies show that even
though a lot of information can be gathered
from mobile devices, forensic examination of
smartphones for Social Network applications
is still challenging due to constant updates
in social network software, smartphone software (operating system), and hardware updates. As Mutawa et al. (2012) report, the
results for different types of applications for
different models of smartphones may change
dramatically after updates by the operating
system (OS) or the social network application. For instance, SnapChat application
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used to keep pictures on the device in an encrypted form. However, decryption key was
hard coded in the application. It was possible to decompile the application and retrieve the key in order to decrypt the files
to access the pictures. In the recent version
of the application however, encryption key
is not located in the application, hence it is
currently infeasible to decrypt the pictures.
We would then suggest to distinguish the OS
and hardware first, and then repeat the experiment for each case separately rather than
collecting a result for a specific device or OS.
If the experiment can be done repeatedly
with different models of the devices and different versions of mobile OSs, weakness and
strength of a particular device and OS can
be identified for further investigations.

4.6

Summary

It is important to protect OSN users from
attacks and develop tools for forensics analysis to detect criminal activities and identify criminals. OSN service providers usually employ defense mechanisms through authentications (e.g., Captchas), security and
privacy settings, internal mechanisms to detect fake profiles or attacks, and reporting
malicious users or behaviors. Developing effective methods for protection and deploying
discouraging strategies for attackers is critical for trustable OSNs.
Forensics analysts may use authorship
analysis, profile matching, and user categorization techniques to identify fake users
on OSNs. Fake messages could be analyzed
by assigning credibility scores and demoted,
blocked and removed before they cause actual harm. OSN service providers may inform about the susceptibility of users and
develop methods for quarantining sections of
the network to avoid propagation of malicious messages. OSN service providers may
also consider assigning scores to OSN users
and such scores could be used for acceptc 2016 ADFSL
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ing or rejecting friendship requests by users.
These scores could also be helpful to identify
fake identities for forensics analysts. Forensics investigators may analyze the traces of
OSN data for collecting information about
criminals. Those traces may reveal the profiles used OSNs and the possible terror networks.
We have added a few more recommendations to those suggested by (Fire, Goldschmidt, & Elovici, 2014) for OSN users:
1. not disclosing unnecessary personal information,
2. proper management of privacy and security settings,
3. rejecting friendships from strangers,
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4. increase the strength and frequency of
security measures (e.g., Captchas),
5. validate users with IDs or phone numbers beyond email,
6. increase user awareness (e.g., informing
about how much privacy is disclosed),
7. develop effective and simple access control methods,
8. develop measures for trustability of
nodes, relationships, and messages (e.g.,
deploy methods to analyze anomalous
behaviors),
9. incorporate user validation techniques
to help users to confirm friendships,

4. removing unnecessary or idle friendships,

10. deploy methods for reporting malicious
activities,

5. installing internet security software,

11. analyze content of messages and posts
for inappropriate material, and

6. uninstalling third party applications,
7. informing about malicious users,
8. not disclosing your location,
9. not trusting your OSN friends and their
friends,
10. being alert to abnormal behavior of
friends and relatives using OSNs, and
11. monitoring online activities of your
child.
Based on our analysis of research studies,
OSN service providers should

12. label messages whether verified or not
and provide links from external resources.
Forensics investigators need tools for
1. categorizing OSN users (i.e., bots, cyborgs, human users),
2. distinguishing fake identities and identifying true owners of fake profiles,
3. profile matching within a single OSN or
across multiple OSNs,
4. authorship analysis for OSNs,

1. avoid or limit auto-creation of fake identities,
2. increase anonymity of the network (e.g.,
by deploying fake accounts),
3. increase the security of messaging,
c 2016 ADFSL

5. detecting fake messages,
6. analyzing credibility of messages,
7. determining authenticity of relationships, and
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8. searching traces of relevant OSN data to
solve cases.
Among the proposed defense techniques,
wrapper-based privacy preservation techniques are designed with good will for honest
users; however, they provide another level
of shield for attackers. These defense techniques should not strengthen the strategies
of attackers. Another issue is that it is
not possible to trust the defense methods
as they are usually detection based methods
and hard to verify their performance or accuracy since it is not known how many fake
identities, relationships, and messages exist
in real OSNs. Typically, defense methods
consider possible ways of attacks and are designed to protect from those types of attacks.
Margirot syndrome (discussed above) could
be a possibility for OSN defense methods.

5.

OPEN RESEARCH
ISSUES AND
CONCLUSION

One of the most important novelties of the
new millennium is online social networks
with the advanced and simple communication technologies through easily accessible
devices such as smartphones. In the past,
one of the major limitations of forensics research was availability of data for forensics
research. With publicly available online social network data and supporting APIs from
online social network sites, there have been
vast amount of data to be processed and
analyzed. Since OSNs are available worldwide, they enable sharing of knowledge and
experiences for protecting against terrorist
attacks, criminal acts, and deception at different parts of the world.
In this paper, we provide an overview of
some techniques that are useful for social
network forensics. We have covered identifying network structures, determining the
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ranks of individuals in these networks, spatial behavior of crime/terror networks, determining the similarity of terror networks,
information diffusion, a socio-economic factors leading to crimes and joining crime and
terror networks. We have analyzed social
attacks through online social networks and
organized them into four levels: criminal activity, type of attack, scheme of attack, and
attack component. We have explained how
attacks are launched using various schemes
of attacks and attack components. With
the availability of affordable devices (such
as $35 Amazon Kindle), children enjoy the
entertainment and information provided by
the Internet. Nowadays, most online games
also provide a chat messaging system built in
them and children may be exposed to people
with indecent behavior. We have analyzed
a few papers for the protection of our children. For protecting OSN users and forensics analysis, we explained privacy preservation methods, user categorization, authorship analysis, profile matching, credibility
of messages, detecting deception, proposing safe relationships, and finding traces of
OSNs on mobile devices for forensics analysis.
Despite numerous and various approaches
for analyzing crime, terror networks and social attacks, these do not deter malicious
people to abuse OSNs and their users. Our
major goal in this paper was to present the
available approaches for forensics analysis to
prevent crimes, discourage malicious people
abusing these online social networks, solve
crimes and detect criminals and increase user
awareness of possible risks of using OSNs,
and recommend actions for forensics investigators, OSN service providers, and OSN
users. Fundamental components of forensics
analysis are likely to be the same but techniques should evolve as OSNs improve and
provide more functionalities. We list possible issues with current approaches and proc 2016 ADFSL
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pose future research as follows:
1. Temporal Analysis of Crime and Terror
Networks. Many research studies aim
analyzing network structure and similarities of such networks as mentioned
in Section 2. There are a few studies focusing on spatial analysis of these networks. However, temporal evolution of
these networks have not been studied
in depth. Some major crime and terrorist networks are using OSNs for recruitment. The temporal growth analysis of these networks should be analyzed
and necessary precautions and analysis
should be done before these crime and
terror networks grow.
2. Accuracy of Detection. Forensics analysts should be aware that the accuracy
of detecting criminals, networks, fake
identities, social attacks, etc. could be
misleading. We do not have complete,
accurate and ground-truth information
about attacks and networks that utilize OSNs. The analysis is usually performed around known attacks and networks. Therefore, the accuracy of analysis is mostly related to the precision of
detection and it may not consider recall.
In other words, there may be many undetected or unknown attacks, fake identities, and networks on OSNs. Some research studies consider possible attack
scenarios and verify whether OSNs are
stable or not towards such attacks. Attackers may come up with their own
schemes of attacks. Attackers are assumed to have different behaviors, connections, and profiles which could be
separated from regular users. It is also
possible for sophisticated attackers to
imitate a real person. Forensics analysts
should be cautious when relying on accuracy of detection methods.
c 2016 ADFSL
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3. The Maginot Syndrome. It is likely that
the defense systems for OSNs might be
useless for sophisticated or undetected
attacks. Developing enhanced and powerful defense methods may not make
OSNs safe. Especially considering the
fact that some possible attack scenarios
are developed by researchers, there is a
high risk of vulnerability of OSNs for
undetected and sophisticated attacks.
4. Trusting OSNs and Fake Identities.
There are users who do not trust OSNs
as well as users who are likely to believe what they see on OSNs. It is hard
to gain complete trust of users in presence of many possible attacks. Important attacks are built around fake identities. The following suggestion could
be considered by OSNs for users who
do not want to use their real identities
but still would like to utilize services of
OSNs. OSNs may allow users to create
accounts with verifiable information but
represent them in different ways. Such
representations along with a note or sign
should be clearly visible to other users
such that information is not true profile or information of the person. This
resembles virtual card numbers offered
by credit card companies where credit
card companies issue a temporary card
number for limited use and the credit
card companies can verify such information. This may help to resolve some issues coming through fake identities. It
is known that not all fake identities are
for deception or attacks. In these cases,
actual user information should be validated before creating those identities.
5. OSN-generated
Recommendations.
Recommendations by OSNs also help
attackers. Users should be notified of
how recommendations are generated.
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Especially, users should be informed
about OSN recommended relationships.
For example, OSN recommends user
B to user A and then user A may
want to connect with user B. OSNs
should let user B know that this interaction happened with the help of their
recommendation system.
6. Certifying Bots and Third-party Applications. Bots or programs that collect
information or interact with users must
be certified by the OSN. Users should
be able to determine bots serving for enhancing functionalities of OSNs as well
as third-party programs.
7. Considering OSN Trolls Disseminating
Violence. It is quite common that Internet trolls target OSN users in order
to lead them to criminal activities. Currently available methods related to user
identification and authorship detection
could be used to create new tools for law
enforcement’s disposal in order to hunt
OSN trolls causing criminal and terrorist activities.
8. Building a Consortium of OSN Service Providers. There are attacks designed using multiple OSNs. OSN service providers should form a consortium and determine what types of facilities and services should be provided
to forensics investigators. Such consortium may also determine analyzing accounts on multiple OSNs and information disclosure using multiple OSNs.
9. Increasing Security Features of OSNs.
OSN service providers must enhance
security of messaging and validation
of creating new accounts. Especially,
for avoiding creation of fake nodes,
strong Captchas are highly recommended. OSN service providers should
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analyze identity cloning, fake identity
creation, detect spams and malware,
and inform relevant users.
10. Instant Notification of Malicious Acts
and Posts. OSN service providers must
enable tools for instant notification of
criminal activities. Law enforcement
agencies should have branches for dealing crimes through OSNs and should cooperate with OSN service providers for
emergency cases.
11. Training OSN Users.
OSN service
providers may provide sample scenarios
and tests about how much information
is revealed based on current privacy and
security settings, acceptance of friendships from strangers, and publishing
careless location information.
OSN
service providers should encourage installing internet security software. It
would be interesting to give scores to
OSN users based on how alerted they
are to possible attacks or attribute closure. Similar measures may also be
provided how much information is visible about themselves. OSN service
providers should provide methods about
actions to be taken when abnormal behavior or posts are detected by users.
12. Scoring Identities, Relationships and
Messages.
OSN service providers
should give scores for OSN users (identities), relationships, and messages. OSN
service providers should provide mechanisms to demote or prevent fake (false)
identities, relationships, or messaging.
Honest OSN users should be promoted.
Methods that are applied for online
product reviews could be adapted in
the short run, and specific OSN methods could be developed in the long run.
OSN service providers should try to verify content of messages or let users verc 2016 ADFSL
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ify content of messages by providing
links to external resources. Unverified
messages could be labeled as ‘unverified’ so that users may not completely
trust the content of messages. OSN
service providers should develop tools
for content-based analysis of multimedia posts and streaming.
13. Accountability in Criminal Cases.
There should be legal frameworks for
OSN service providers on how to act
and what to provide to law enforcement
professionals. Laws should be enhanced
to protect rights of OSN users. OSN
service providers should act accordingly
while protecting their users.

JDFSL V11N4
required tools become available. We organized the papers in a way that researchers
who are interested in social network forensics have a starting point to explore and develop their research methodologies for their
domains. With this, we also aim to help
digital forensics tool developers in order to
create state of the art tools via provided approaches. There were many other research
studies that could benefit social forensics research. We have decided to keep the topics
focused rather than disturbing readers’ attention with related areas. Researchers who
are interested in social network forensics are
highly recommended to explore these related
research areas.

14. Not Protecting Attackers through Defense Methods. We have observed that
some techniques that are developed to
protect the privacy of OSN users actually provide another level of protection
for attackers. While security methods
are developed and used, OSN service
providers should also analyze how those
methods could be used by attackers as
well.
15. Developing Methodological Approaches
for Solving OSN Crimes. Forensics analysts should be provided a general handbook of steps taken for specific crimes
through OSNs. In this paper, for social attacks, we suggest studying attacks
at four levels starting from the crime at
the highest level, the type of attacks at
the second level, scheme of attack at the
third level, and attack component at the
bottom level. After having answers for
these four levels, forensics investigators
should develop a systematic approach
regarding how to deal with each possible
type of crime.
We believe that social network forensics
will be one of the hot areas very soon as the
c 2016 ADFSL
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